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1331 
Meta-Evidence and Preliminary 
Injunctions 
Maggie Wittlin 
The decision to issue a preliminary injunction is enormously consequential; it has been 
likened to “judgment and execution before trial.” Yet, courts regularly say that our primary 
tool for promoting truth seeking at trial—the Federal Rules of Evidence—does not apply at 
preliminary injunction hearings. Judges frequently consider inadmissible evidence to make 
what may be the most important ruling in the case. This Article critically examines this 
widespread evidentiary practice. 
In critiquing courts’ justifications for abandoning the Rules in the preliminary 
injunction context, this Article introduces a new concept: “meta-evidence.” Meta-evidence is 
evidence of what evidence will be presented at trial. I demonstrate that much evidence 
introduced at the preliminary injunction stage is, in fact, meta-evidence. And I show why 
meta-evidence that initially appears inadmissible under the Rules is often, in fact, admissible. 
Applying the Rules at the preliminary injunction stage, then, would not exclude nearly as 
much evidence as courts may have assumed. 
I offer two proposals for how courts should use the Rules at the preliminary injunction 
phase. More ambitiously, I suggest courts should apply the Rules with an exception directly 
tailored to the dangers of limiting admissible evidence when the parties are under time pressure. 
Alternatively, I suggest that courts simply recognize when evidence is actually meta-evidence 
and weigh it appropriately. Courts should acknowledge that meta-evidence is probative only 
to the extent it tends to show the proponent will produce admissible evidence at trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 28, 2017—before he was President Trump’s lawyer—former New 
York City Mayor and presidential adviser Rudy Giuliani appeared on Fox News.1 
Host Jeanine Pirro had invited him on to discuss President Trump’s “travel ban,” 
which temporarily suspended immigration from seven countries.2 When Pirro asked 
Giuliani how Trump chose the specific countries for the ban, Giuliani replied, “I’ll 
tell you the whole history of it. So, when [the President] first announced it, he said 
‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the 
right way to do it legally.’”3 
 
1. Justice with Judge Jeanine: Giuliani: Immigration Ban Is Based on Danger, not Religion (Fox 
News television broadcast Jan. 29, 2017), http://video.foxnews.com/v/5301869519001/ [https://
perma.cc/T8BK-KXWG#sp=show-clips]. 
2. See Exec. Order No. 13,769 § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) (suspending entry of 
persons “from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the [Immigration and Nationality Act]”). 
3. Justice with Judge Jeanine: Giuliani: Immigration Ban Is Based on Danger, not Religion, supra 
note 1. 
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States and human rights organizations began filing lawsuits seeking to enjoin 
the travel ban as soon as it was announced. Not two months after the Giuliani 
interview, a federal judge in Maryland granted a preliminary injunction,4 temporarily 
halting a similar second travel ban.5 The judge found the plaintiffs could 
demonstrate that the primary purpose of the ban was likely to exclude Muslims, not 
to advance national security interests.6 In its analysis, the court cited Giuliani’s 
statements from the Fox News interview, noting, “Mayor Giuliani’s account of his 
conversations with President Trump reveal that the plan had been . . . to 
approximate a Muslim ban without calling it one . . . .”7 When the Supreme Court 
reversed a preliminary injunction of the ban, it, too, cited the interview as evidence.8 
But aren’t Giuliani’s remarks hearsay?9 They are statements made out of court 
offered to show the truth of what’s asserted in the statements—namely, that 
President Trump in fact told Giuliani that he wanted a Muslim ban.10 This is not 
even particularly reliable hearsay.11 Giuliani spoke spontaneously during a 
performative television interview, not solemnly under oath. The meaning of his 
comments was not entirely clear, and he might have misunderstood the President. 
These are precisely the sorts of ambiguities that cross-examination is designed to 
resolve. In other words, isn’t Giuliani’s comment exactly the kind of out-of-court 
statement that factfinders should be prohibited from relying on?12 Yet the district 
court and, later, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit13 relied on the 
statement with little fanfare. 
This is hardly surprising. Just one year earlier, the Fourth Circuit, like many 
circuits before it, held that courts may rely on hearsay or other inadmissible evidence 
 
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
5. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565–66 (D. Md. 2017) 
(enjoining Exec. Order No. 13,780 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017)). 
6. Id. at 563 (“Thus, it is more likely that the primary purpose of the travel ban was grounded 
in religion, and even if the Second Executive Order has a national security purpose, it is likely that its 
primary purpose remains the effectuation of the proposed Muslim ban.”). 
7. Id. at 559. Other district courts also cited the interview in preliminary injunction rulings.  
See id. 
8. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); see also id. at 2436 (Sotomayor,  
J., dissenting). 
9. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
10. Trump’s statements themselves are not hearsay within hearsay, as they are statements of an 
opposing party, admissible under section 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
11. See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) (noting the 
“four testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous memory”). 
12. A proponent of the evidence could argue that Giuliani was an authorized “speaking agent” 
for the president. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C). But that is not apparent from the video or from how 
the opinions discussed the comment. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d at  
558–59, aff’d and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (using the Giuliani comment as evidence of 
Trump’s intent), vacated, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (referring to Giuliani as a “campaign 
adviser[ ]”). President Trump had recently named Giuliani “an informal adviser on cybersecurity.” Abby 
Phillip, Trump Names Rudy Giuliani as Cybersecurity Adviser, WASH. POST, ( Jan. 12, 2017), https://
wapo.st/2ymb19E [https://perma.cc/QF72-Q824]. 
13. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594 (en banc), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
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when making preliminary injunction decisions.14 In that standard-setting case, 
Gavin Grimm (G.G.),15 a transgender teenager in Virginia, had moved for a 
preliminary injunction ordering his school to let him use the boys’ restroom. The 
district court denied the motion, in part because Grimm had relied on “mostly 
inadmissible hearsay”16—principally, his own declaration that a psychologist had 
diagnosed him with gender dysphoria, rather than a declaration from the 
psychologist herself.17 
The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision, concluding that “the district court 
used the wrong evidentiary standard in assessing G.G.’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction.”18 The court stated that preliminary injunctions “are governed by less 
strict rules of evidence,” and “it was error for the district court to summarily reject 
G.G.’s proffered evidence because it may have been inadmissible at a subsequent 
trial.”19 The court joined seven other circuits in concluding that for purposes of a 
preliminary injunction motion, hearsay is admissible; “the nature of evidence as 
hearsay goes to ‘weight, not preclusion.’”20 
While these were newsworthy preliminary injunction motions with culturally 
salient facts, as far as the evidentiary issues go, they were quite typical. Parties 
sometimes do not bother challenging the introduction of inadmissible evidence on 
motions for a preliminary injunction.21 When they do, courts often deny their 
motions, saying that admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) goes 
to weight, not preclusion. If the other party does not challenge the applicability of 
the FRE, the judge may simply entertain the objection and decide whether to admit 
or exclude the evidence.22 This loose practice has gone largely unquestioned both 
in the courts and in the academic literature. That is troubling. Given the importance 
 
14. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 726 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated on 
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
15. Documents in the case refer to Grimm, then a minor, as “G.G.” Because he has discussed 
the case with the press openly, I refer to him by his name here. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm 
Just Wanted to Use the Bathroom. He Didn’t Think the Nation Would Debate It., WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 
2016), http://wapo.st/2bA7XL0 [https://perma.cc/KN29-LML9]. 
16. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 751, 753  
(E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d and vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709. 
17. He did, however, submit a declaration from a different clinical psychologist who had 
examined Grimm for purposes of the lawsuit. See id. at 749. The district court gave little weight to that 
declaration and generally evinced skepticism of Grimm’s claims of harm and solicitude toward the 
school board’s claims. Id. I return to the second declaration later. 
18. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 715. 
19. Id. at 725. 
20. Id. (quoting Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
21. For example, Gloucester County did not challenge Grimm’s evidence.  
See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Grimm, 132 F. Supp. 3d 736  
(No. 4:15-cv-00054-RGD-TEM), ECF No. 30. 
22. See Interview with a United States Magistrate Judge within the Second Circuit ( July 18, 2017) 
[hereinafter Magistrate Judge Interview]; Interview with a United States District Judge within the Tenth 
Circuit (Oct. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview]. 
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of preliminary injunction proceedings—they’re often functionally dispositive23—the 
applicable evidentiary standard can have a large influence on a case. 
This Article critically examines the existing evidentiary practice on preliminary 
injunction motions. It uses textual, historical, and policy analysis to pinpoint 
problems with courts’ justifications for declining to apply the FRE. Ultimately, it 
concludes that the current practice is suboptimal. 
In critiquing the justifications for disregarding the FRE at preliminary 
injunction hearings, this Article introduces a new and useful concept: “meta-evidence.” 
I define meta-evidence as evidence of what evidence will be produced at trial. To 
obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that they are “likely to succeed 
on the merits.”24 Evidence offered in support of this key element is meta-evidence; 
it is evidence of what admissible evidence that party will present at trial. 
Here’s why that matters: A central policy concern with applying the FRE at 
the preliminary injunction stage is that the rules will exclude too much evidence and 
either stop courts from preventing irreparable harm or induce them to inflict it. But 
simply eliminating the FRE in this context uses a blunt instrument for a nuanced 
problem. Instead, by focusing on what the evidence is being offered to prove at this stage, 
we can see that much evidence that initially appears inadmissible under the FRE 
would actually be admissible. Specifically, the rule against hearsay prohibits parties 
from introducing out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted.25 But 
a meta-evidentiary statement is offered not for its truth, but rather to prove that the 
declarant could testify to the substance of the statement at a future trial.26 The 
statement, then, is non-hearsay. Under this understanding, a large portion of the 
supposedly “inadmissible” evidence at the preliminary injunction stage is, in fact, 
admissible meta-evidence. 
An understanding of meta-evidence also allows judges to come to more 
accurate determinations of the likelihood of success on the merits. Courts should 
give greater weight to meta-evidence that clearly indicates that the offering party 
will be able to produce admissible evidence at trial and less weight to meta-evidence 
that does not clearly point to forthcoming admissible evidence. The Article also 
discusses how “meta-evidence” can yield insight into motions for summary 
judgment and motions to dismiss. 
Part I of this Article introduces preliminary injunctions and discusses the 
current practice of courts with respect to preliminary injunction evidence and the 
 
23. See infra Section II.C.1. 
24. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
25. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
26. James Duane has made a similar move in the summary judgment context—arguing 
affidavits used at summary judgment are non-hearsay because they are offered only to show what’s to 
come at trial. James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52  
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1531–44 (1995). Duane’s insight serves to clear up confused descriptions 
of summary judgment in treatises and advisory committee notes. He does not suggest the argument has 
any doctrinal implications, as Rule 56 explicitly permits affidavits on summary judgment. See  
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In the preliminary injunction context, the insight has real payoff. 
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FRE. Part II examines whether disregarding the FRE is justified by looking at text, 
history, and policy. Part II introduces the concept of meta-evidence and uses that 
concept to explain why applying the FRE at the preliminary injunction stage will 
not exclude as much evidence as courts have suggested. Part III sets out the benefits 
and drawbacks of applying the FRE to preliminary injunctions. 
Finally, Part IV makes two proposals for improving consideration of evidence 
at the preliminary injunction stage. The first proposal is more ambitious and more 
tentative: Courts should apply the FRE but add an escape hatch, akin to the residual 
hearsay exception. If (1) time constraints prevent a party from obtaining admissible 
evidence, and the party offers otherwise-inadmissible evidence that (2) is sufficiently 
trustworthy and (3) will not unduly prejudice the other party, a court should 
consider that evidence at the preliminary injunction stage. Applying the FRE with 
the addition of this escape hatch would enhance both predictability and accuracy.27 
The second proposal is more modest: even if courts continue to ignore the FRE, 
they should use the meta-evidence idea to determine the weight of evidence at the 
preliminary injunction stage. 
Under both proposals, the Giuliani statement would come in. But under both 
proposals, courts should give it less weight than they might be tempted to give it. 
The statement is not admissible under the FRE to prove that President Trump 
actually made the alleged remarks. But it is admissible to prove that this declarant, 
Rudy Giuliani, could come and testify at a future trial. To the extent the statement 
tends to prove that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed at trial—and only to that 
extent—it is admissible and probative meta-evidence.28 
I. THE LAW AS IT STANDS 
A. Preliminary Injunctions: A Brief Introduction 
When a plaintiff fears that a defendant will cause irreparable harm in the time 
between the commencement of a lawsuit and trial, that plaintiff may seek a 
preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction grants temporary injunctive relief 
to the movant and usually remains in effect until the court issues a final judgment 
on the merits.29 Plaintiffs seek, and courts grant, preliminary injunctions in a wide 
variety of cases. These range from private disputes—such as when an employer 
seeks to enjoin a former employee from disclosing trade secrets30 or violating a 
 
27. This approach would satisfy the central purpose of the preliminary injunction standard, “to 
minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision.” John 
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540–41 (1978). 
28. Under the second proposal, it would be admissible to prove that President Trump actually 
made the remarks, but only to the extent that it tends to prove there will be evidence of animus at trial. 
29. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 
(3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2018). 
30. See, e.g., Cerro Fabricated Prods. L.L.C. v. Solanick, 300 F. Supp. 3d 632 (M.D. Pa. 2018); 
Pyro Spectaculars N., Inc. v. Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Uncle B’s Bakery,  
Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996). 
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covenant not to compete,31 or when one company seeks to enjoin another from 
infringing its patent,32 copyright,33 or trademark34—to cases with major public 
impact, such as environmental litigation,35 challenges to federal immigration 
policy,36 and litigation seeking to enjoin state restrictions on abortion.37 
The preliminary injunction phase is often high stakes for both the movant and 
the defendant. The movant alleges that it will be irreparably harmed absent a timely 
injunction—an injunction at the end of the case will not suffice to prevent injury; 
compensation will not make the movant whole. The defendant is at risk of being 
subject to an invasive court order prior to a full trial on the merits, and the 
defendant, too, may face the prospect of irreparable harm caused by the  
preliminary relief. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 65 allows a party to seek a preliminary 
injunction on notice to the other party.38 The Rule is modeled on Equity Rule 73 
and codifies a remedy that extends back to at least eighteenth-century English 
Chancery.39 Rule 65 is sparse; it does not set out a substantive standard for granting 
preliminary injunctions, and it does not specify what sort of hearing a preliminary 
injunction motion requires. Courts have stepped in on both fronts.40 
Courts emphasize that the “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 
never awarded as of right.”41 But they have also long considered four factors in 
determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction: “[1] the plaintiff’s likelihood 
of success on the merits, [2] the prospect of irreparable harm, [3] the comparative 
 
31. See, e.g., Maaco Franchising, Inc. v. Augustin, No. 09-4548, 2010 WL 1644278  
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2010); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Iowa 1995). 
32. See, e.g., Everett Labs., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 855 (D.N.J. 2008); 
P.N.A. Constr. Techs., Inc. v. McTech Grp., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
33. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997); Perfect 10,  
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
34. See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2004); Bebe Stores,  
Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Int’l, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
35. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011); Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
36. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (affirming preliminary injunction of President Trump’s “travel ban”); Texas v. United States, 809 
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming preliminary injunction of President Obama’s deferred action 
programs), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
37. See, e.g., Edwards v. Beck, 946 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Ark. 2013); Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 
F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1998). 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). Rule 65 also provides for temporary restraining orders, which may be 
issued without notice to the other party and can remain in place for no more than 14 days. See  
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
39. See Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Procedure as Compared with the Former 
Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 184 (1939); Leubsdorf, supra note 
27, at 528. 
40. As Leubsdorf notes, these standards initially developed because the preliminary injunction 
proceeding occurred in Chancery while the eventual trial would occur in a court of law. Leubsdorf, supra 
note 27, at 530–33. 
41. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 
U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). 
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hardship to the parties of granting or denying relief, and [4] sometimes the impact 
of relief on the public interest.”42 Courts have differed as to how they apply these 
factors, however, and both courts and commentators have disagreed as to whether 
the plaintiff needs to make a strong showing on each element independently,43 or 
whether the factors should be evaluated on a “sliding scale” where more serious, 
more probable harms demand a lower showing of likelihood of success at trial.44 
In his classic article on preliminary injunctions, John Leubsdorf argued that 
“the preliminary injunction standard should aim to minimize the probable 
irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision.”45 He thereby 
endorsed a sliding-scale type model, where the judge multiplies the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success by the prospective harm to the plaintiff of denying the 
injunction and compares that to the defendant’s likelihood of success times the 
prospective harm to defendant of granting the injunction.46 Under this sliding-scale 
regime, a greater likelihood of success can offset a lower level of harm, and vice 
versa. The relevant harm, Leubsdorf notes, is “harm resulting from an erroneous 
preliminary decision” that “final relief cannot redress.”47 This understanding of 
harm, then, distinguishes preliminary injunctions from permanent injunctions. The 
court should grant the preliminary injunction when the probable irreparable loss of 
rights to the plaintiff, if the injunction is denied, exceeds the probable irreparable 
loss of rights to the defendant if the injunction is granted.48 At least one 
commentator has concluded that the Leubsdorf economic model, later adopted by 
Judge Posner, has “emerged as the triumphant, dominant theory of preliminary 
injunctions.”49 
The Supreme Court somewhat clarified the standard for awarding preliminary 
injunctions in 2008’s Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council.50 The Court 
proclaimed that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he 
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that 
an injunction is in the public interest.”51 The Ninth Circuit had held that if the 
 
42. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 525. 
43. Cf. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal 
Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 538 (2003) (“If the moving party is able to demonstrate the primary 
necessity for a preliminary injunction, it should then be required to demonstrate at least a 50% chance 
of success on the merits.”). 
44. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011) (Mosman, 
J., concurring) (“A sliding scale approach, including the ‘serious questions’ test, preserves the flexibility 
that is so essential to handling preliminary injunctions, and that is the hallmark of relief in equity.”). 
45. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 540–41; see also Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 
F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (majority opinion). 
46. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 542. 
47. Id. at 541. 
48. Id. at 542. 
49. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109,  
154 (2001). 
50. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
51. Id. at 20. 
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plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of success, it need only show a possibility 
of irreparable harm.52 The Supreme Court rejected this idea, citing the standard, 
which specifies that irreparable injury absent an injunction must be “likely.”53 
The Court did not go so far as to reject sliding-scale tests entirely, however, 
and it ultimately decided the case based on the balance of equities and the public 
interest.54 Justice Ginsburg in dissent suggested that, even after Winter, courts can 
sometimes award “relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood 
of success is very high.”55 She noted that the hallmark of equity is flexibility, which 
permits courts to eschew “particular, predetermined quant[a] of probable success 
or injury” and instead use a sliding scale.56 Courts have differed in their reaction to 
Winter.57 The Second,58 Third,59 Seventh,60 and Ninth61 Circuits kept their 
(somewhat varied) sliding-scale standards, which, with one possible exception,62 
allow a lower likelihood-of-success showing when the balance of harms tips strongly 
in favor of an injunction. Conversely, Winter addressed whether courts could allow 
a weaker irreparable harm showing in the face of a strong likelihood of success. The 
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, deemed its sliding-scale standard untenable in 
Winter’s wake and now requires “that the plaintiff make a clear showing that it will 
likely succeed on the merits at trial.”63 The Tenth Circuit came to a similar 
conclusion.64 Overall, while its influence was somewhat muted by Winter, both the 
 
52. Id. at 21. 
53. Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted). 
54. Id. at 26. 
55. Id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I 
do not believe it does so today.”). 
56. Id. 
57. See generally Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for 
Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522 (2011). 
58. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 
30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The ‘serious questions’ standard permits a district court to grant a preliminary 
injunction in situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving party is more likely 
than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits 
of not granting the injunction.”). 
59. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “a movant 
for preliminary equitable relief must meet the threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors,” then 
the court “considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, 
taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief”). 
60. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 
725 (7th Cir. 2009) (“How strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the 
more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while 
still supporting some preliminary relief.”). 
61. See All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘[S]erious 
questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support 
issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.”). 
62. See Reilly, 858 F.3d at 176–79 (requiring a threshold showing that the movant “can win on 
the merits”). 
63. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009). 
64. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(“Under Winter’s rationale, any modified test which relaxes one of the prongs for preliminary relief and 
thus deviates from the standard test is impermissible.”). 
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Ginsburg dissent and the continued use of sliding-scale tests in several circuits 
indicate that Leubsdorf’s underlying theory retains purchase in the federal courts.65 
The procedural and evidentiary regime governing preliminary injunction 
motions is the focus of the next Section and, indeed, the rest of this Article. 
B. Evidence and Preliminary Injunctions 
This Section addresses how federal courts currently evaluate the admissibility 
of evidence at the preliminary injunction stage. It shows that in decisions addressing 
the issue, courts overwhelmingly do not apply the FRE—they uniformly reject 
application of the rule against hearsay, and some courts will not entertain objections 
under other rules as well. In addition, some courts suggest judges should not exclude 
evidence at all at the preliminary injunction stage. This Section then discusses how 
these published decisions do not capture the full practice of the courts. Ultimately, 
the general pattern among district courts is that they tend to admit most evidence 
and give it the weight they deem proper. 
When circuit courts have discussed admissibility of evidence for purposes of 
preliminary injunction motions, they have frequently cited the Supreme Court case, 
University of Texas v. Camenisch.66 In explaining why a lower court’s finding on the 
“likelihood of success on the merits” factor was not tantamount to an actual 
decision on the merits, the Court stated: 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Given this 
limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those 
positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on 
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than 
in a trial on the merits.67 
Camenisch thus both summarized practice to that point and set the stage for more 
direct dismissal of the FRE in the preliminary injunction context. 
The question of whether the FRE apply at the preliminary injunction stage has 
arisen most frequently in the context of whether a district court should exclude 
hearsay. Every circuit to consider whether hearsay can be considered on a 
preliminary injunction motion has concluded that it can.68 Specifically, the First,69 
 
65. See Bates, supra note 57, at 1543. 
66. Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); see, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 2016); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d  
Cir. 2010); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718 (3d Cir. 2004); Heideman v. South Salt 
Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). 
67. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added). 
68. See generally Michael J. Lichtenstein, Settling the Law in the Circuits: Presenting Hearsay 
Evidence in a Preliminary Injunction Hearing, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 415 (2005). 
69. See Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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Second,70 Third,71 Fourth,72 Fifth,73 Seventh,74 Ninth,75 Tenth,76 and Eleventh77 
Circuits have all set standards that permit hearsay at the preliminary injunction stage. 
The Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits appear not to have addressed the issue, 
although the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged that courts sometimes receive 
inadmissible evidence on preliminary injunction motions,78 and district courts 
within the Sixth Circuit often admit hearsay.79 
While each of these courts’ standards disposes of the rule against hearsay in 
the preliminary injunction context, the standards aren’t precisely identical. 
Specifically, they suggest potentially divergent answers to two questions: First, 
should courts evaluate whether to admit or exclude hearsay evidence, even though 
they are not bound by the FRE, or should they just admit all evidence? And second, 
are these decisions limited to the rule against hearsay, or are courts free to disregard 
all of the rules of evidence? 
1. Evaluation of Hearsay Admissibility 
Some circuits suggest that while courts may consider hearsay evidence on 
preliminary injunction motions, judges should still evaluate whether to admit or 
exclude evidence. The First Circuit was, appropriately, the first circuit to articulate 
this sort of standard. In Asseo v. Pan American Grain Co., the court noted, 
“[a]ffidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction 
proceedings,” and explained, “[t]he dispositive question is not their classification as 
hearsay but whether, weighing all the attendant factors, including the need for 
expedition, this type of evidence was appropriate given the character and objectives 
 
70. See Mullins, 626 F.3d at 52. 
71. See Kos Pharm., Inc., 369 F.3d at 718–19. 
72. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725–26 (4th Cir. 2016). 
73. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993). 
74. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, 
Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997). 
75. See Flynt Distribution Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). 
76. See Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). Heideman was 
the one case that did not arise in the context of considering hearsay. Rather, in distinguishing a 
preliminary injunction hearing from a trial on the merits, the court noted, “[t]he Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.” Id. 
77. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995). 
78. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 535 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014); see 
also Unsecured Creditors Comm. of DeLorean Motor Co. v. DeLorean (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 755 
F.2d 1223, 1230 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The parties assume that the Federal Rules of Evidence are fully 
applicable to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. We express no opinion on this question. But 
see 11 C[HARLES ALAN] WRIGHT & A[RTHUR R.] MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  
§ 2949 (1973) (affidavits may be used to support preliminary injunction; ‘trial court should be allowed 
to give even inadmissible evidence some weight’).”). 
79. See Damon’s Rests., Inc. v. Eileen K Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 607, 620 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not explicitly stated whether hearsay evidence 
may be considered in the context of a preliminary injunction hearing. . . . This Court, however, and 
other district courts within this circuit have considered such evidence, as have numerous other  
circuit courts.”). 
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of the injunctive proceeding.”80 Several other circuits have adopted the  
Asseo standard.81 
Sometimes district courts evaluate admissibility.82 This reasoning is typically 
fairly cursory,83 but sometimes it’s more detailed.84 Although courts that both 
recognize this more relaxed standard and evaluate the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence usually admit it, courts occasionally do exclude evidence after evaluation.85 
Other courts do not evaluate the admissibility based on an explicit standard but do 
state that courts have discretion to consider or not consider evidentiary submissions 
on a motion for a preliminary injunction.86 Indeed, several courts of appeals have 
indicated that evidentiary determinations at the preliminary injunction stage should 
 
80. Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986). In Asseo, the injunction was 
requested pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 24. The court evaluated 
the propriety of the relief under the usual preliminary injunction standards. See id. at 26. 
81. See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718–19 (3d Cir. 2004); SEC v. Cherif, 
933 F.2d 403, 412 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991); Levi Strauss & Co., 51 F.3d at 985 (Eleventh Circuit). 
82. See, e.g., Amadi v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 245 F. Supp. 3d 316, 319 (D. Mass. 2017) 
(evaluating affidavits under the Asseo standard and deciding not to strike them); Pendergest-Holt  
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, No. H-09-3712, 2010 WL 3359528, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 
2010) (evaluating evidence under a “relaxed” standard to ensure only reliable evidence is admitted). 
83. See, e.g., RB Jai Alai, L.L.C. v. Sec’y of the Fla. Dep’t of Transp., No. 6:13-cv-1167-Orl-
40GJK, 2014 WL 12617740, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2014) (“There is nothing to suggest that Birdoff’s 
or Catina’s affidavits are inappropriate in light of the character and objectives of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction . . . .”); Novosel v. Wrenn, No. 10-cv-165-PB, 2011 WL 2633026, at *7 n.2 
(D.N.H. Feb. 16, 2011) (“The preliminary injunction hearing presented sufficient bases for considering 
Mijo’s hearsay statements as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted . . . .”); Aviara Parkway Farms, 
Inc. v. Agropecuaria La Finca, S.P.R. de R.L., No. 08 CV 2301 JM (CAB), 2009 WL 249790, at *4  
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (“Given the expeditious and complex nature of this proceeding, the declarative 
evidence has been considered by the court.”); In re Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 05-CV-7097, 2006 WL 
1525661, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2006) (“Given the size of the putative class, the stage of this litigation, 
the purpose of the relief sought, counsel’s declarations that Ameriquest borrowers in fact provided 
them with the NORTCs, and the number, consistency and clarity of the forms themselves, it is 
appropriate to consider the NORTCs submitted by counsel.”); CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-call.com, Inc., 73 
F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (“Plaintiff’s affidavits contain sufficiently reliable and relevant 
information to overcome defendant’s hearsay objection.”). 
84. See, e.g., Westernbank P.R. v. Kachkar, No. 07-1606(ADC), 2009 WL 2871160, at *21 
(D.P.R. Sept. 1, 2009) (discussing circumstances that lend credibility to an affidavit); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. CCC Holdings Inc., No. 08-2043(RMC), 2009 WL 10631282, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2009) 
(reasoning that the court will consider hearsay, but not double hearsay or unsworn declarations because 
they lack sufficient reliability). 
85. See, e.g., A.A. v. Raymond, No. 2:13-cv-01167-KJM-EFB, 2013 WL 3816565, at *7  
(E.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (“The court sustains defendant’s objections to hearsay in the Casillas 
declaration.” The court noted that while it sustained several objections, it would “otherwise consider[ ] 
the objections in assigning appropriate weight to the evidence.”); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, No.  
CV06-7608-VBF( JCX), 2007 WL 790061, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (noting that “this Court will 
continue to observe the prohibition against hearsay evidence” and excluding certain exhibits  
and testimony). 
86. See, e.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179 KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4  
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017), vacated on other grounds, 854 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2017); Rice v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 2 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[T]his court has broad discretion in deciding what evidence 
to consider in connection with a motion for preliminary injunction, including hearsay.”). 
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be evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard.87 The existence of a standard 
of review indicates that courts should be making reviewable decisions—they should 
be deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence. 
The Second Circuit struck a different note. In Mullins v. City of New York, that 
court explained, “[t]he admissibility of hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
goes to weight, not preclusion, at the preliminary injunction stage.”88 Some district 
courts, in line with this suggestion, do not appear to consider whether or not 
otherwise inadmissible evidence should be admitted on a preliminary injunction 
motion; they effectively admit the evidence automatically.89 The issue, then, is 
whether courts explicitly consider admissibility when they decide how much weight 
to give the evidence. Some courts admit the evidence without discussing whether 
they considered its admissibility for purposes of weighing the evidence.90 Others do 
explicitly consider the admissibility of the evidence in determining the weight to 
afford it,91 occasionally giving thoughtful and detailed treatment to the question.92 
 
87. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2744–45 (2015) (“To the extent that the reliability 
of Dr. Evans’ testimony is even before us, the District Court’s conclusion that his testimony was based 
on reliable sources is reviewed under the deferential ‘abuse-of-discretion’ standard.”); Coal. of 
Concerned Citizens to Make Art Smart v. Fed. Transit Admin., 843 F.3d 886, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(“As for the evidentiary rulings made by the district court in connection with denying the plaintiffs’ 
motion for preliminary injunction, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.”); Republic of the 
Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“It was within the discretion of 
the district court to accept this hearsay for purposes of deciding whether to issue the  
preliminary injunction.”). 
88. Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010). 
89. See, e.g., McGehee, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4 (“The Court, therefore, in its discretion will 
consider all evidentiary submissions at this stage, giving these submissions appropriate weight, without 
regard to whether these evidentiary submissions meet the strict evidentiary requirements . . . .”); 
Wildearth Guardians v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Civ. No. 07-00710 MV/WDS, 2008 WL 11327379, at 
*11 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2008). 
90. See, e.g., Veramark Techs., Inc. v. Bouk, 10 F. Supp. 3d 395, 401 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(overruling admissibility objections because “the rules of evidence are not strictly applied”); Todd  
v. RWI Acquisition L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00114-MCA-GBW, 2012 WL 12882371, at *5 (D.N.M. June 
12, 2012) (“Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to hearings on preliminary injunctions, 
the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike . . . .”); Keep a Breast Found. v. Seven Grp., No. 11-cv-
00570 BEN (WMc), 2011 WL 2940290, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“As noted in the Order to 
Show Cause, however, courts may consider otherwise inadmissible evidence for Rule 65 purposes. . . . 
Therefore, Defendants’ evidentiary objections are overruled.”); R.B. ex rel. Parent v. Mastery Charter 
Sch., 762 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals 
Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D.N.J. 1988) (“I accepted all evidence mindful that hearsay 
materials and evidence other than live testimony are properly considered by the Court in preliminary 
injunction proceedings.”). 
91. See, e.g., CF 135 Flat L.L.C. v. Triadou SPV N.A., 15-CV-5345(AJN), 2016 WL 5945912, at 
*2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2016) (“While the fact that certain evidence is hearsay ‘goes to [the] weight’ 
that the Court may afford certain evidence, it is not a basis for ‘preclusion’ at this stage.”) (alteration in 
original); Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, No. 4:09CV3268, 2010 WL 2015269, at *2 (D. Neb. May 19, 
2010) (“The questionable reliability of certain evidence will be considered by the Court when it 
determines what weight the evidence should be given.”). 
92. See, e.g., USA Visionary Concepts, L.L.C. v. MR Int’l, L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-00874-DGK, 
2009 WL 10672094, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2009) (giving limited weight to hearsay of questionable 
reliability and no weight to comments made during settlement discussions so as not “to deter parties 
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Often, courts parrot the refrain that evidentiary concerns “go to weight rather  
than admissibility.”93 
Finally, district courts sometimes appear to apply the FRE with full force in 
the preliminary injunction context.94 In these cases, the parties may not have 
disputed that the FRE apply at this stage; they may have simply argued the 
evidentiary issues under the Rules.95 
Some courts exclude evidence at the preliminary injunction stage; some don’t. 
Some courts consider the FRE when determining weight; some may not. Do these 
differences in practice make any difference in the end? It is difficult to say. Under 
both the Asseo regime and the Mullins regime, the court considers whether a 
particular piece of evidence will help it make a well-founded decision on the motion. 
The court may be guided by the FRE and its underlying principles of reliability, but 
the court is never bound by those Rules. Judges retain substantial discretion to use 
the evidence as they see fit. 
2. Non-Hearsay Rules 
At the preliminary injunction stage, the most common evidentiary issues relate 
to hearsay, and federal courts of appeals have not explicitly considered whether 
other rules of evidence apply. However, the Tenth Circuit has stated its practice 
categorically, untethered from the hearsay context: “The Federal Rules of Evidence 
do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”96 Unusually, the court announced 
this broad statement of law not in response to any particular challenged evidence 
but rather in its “Standards of Review” section concerning the review of a 
preliminary injunction denial for abuse of discretion. District courts within the 
Tenth Circuit have taken the declaration at face value, generally admitting evidence 
 
from engaging in settlement discussions”); Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 99 CIV.1452( JGK), 1999 
WL 509471, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999) (“The Court has, nevertheless, applied the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in determining the weight to be accorded the evidence that was introduced and has also 
assessed whether the evidence would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”) 
93. See, e.g., Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 
(C.D. Cal. 2015). 
94. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Fox, No. 3:09-cv-0756, 2010 WL 3807167 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2010) 
(considering a litany of objections to evidence presented at a preliminary injunction hearing); Schering 
Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7000(LMM), 1999 WL 144921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1999), vacated, 189 
F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999). 
95.  See Defendants’ Motion to Strike Evidence Presented During the Preliminary Injunction 
Hearing and Memorandum in Support Thereof, Spurlock, No. 3:09-cv-0756, 2010 WL 3807167, ECF 
No. 128; Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Motion to Strike and Motions in Limine, id., ECF No. 130. 
96. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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without regard to the FRE,97 and it has now become boilerplate.98 Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit has noted in a footnote that “the rules of evidence do not apply strictly 
to preliminary injunction proceedings.”99 
But do district courts actually consider evidence that violates rules other than 
the rule against hearsay? Different district courts appear to have taken different 
approaches to this question. I have specifically looked at whether courts have 
applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert100—which require a judge to act 
as a gatekeeper for expert evidence, ensuring that the factfinder considers only 
reliable evidence—at the preliminary injunction phase. (Courts have noted that 
Daubert is less important in bench trials than in jury trials, but it still applies.) I have 
also examined whether they apply Rule 408, which targets statements made during 
settlement negotiations. 
Some courts, citing the above cases, have declined to apply Rule 702 and 
Daubert. These courts admit the expert evidence independent of its reliability, but 
they often consider the parties’ Daubert arguments when weighing the testimony.101 
Similarly, some courts have admitted the evidence but used Daubert to determine 
whether the evidence should receive any weight.102 This is somewhat similar to the 
 
97. See, e.g., Todd v. RWI Acquisition L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00114-MCA-GBW, 2012 WL 
12882371, at *5 (D.N.M. June 12, 2012) (“Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to 
hearings on preliminary injunctions, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike . . . . The parties’ 
arguments pertain to the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility.”). 
98. See, e.g., Navajo Health Found.—Sage Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Burwell, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 
1126 (D.N.M. 2015); Wildearth Guardians v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 07-00710 MV/WDS, 2008 WL 
11327379, at *11 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2008). 
99. Herb Reed Enters., L.L.C. v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th  
Cir. 2013). 
100. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
101. See McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179 KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4  
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017) (declining to apply Daubert at the preliminary injunction stage but carefully 
weighting the expert evidence in accordance with its reliability); Tex. Med. Providers Performing 
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 956 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 667 
F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding arguments that declarations did not satisfy Daubert and were 
otherwise inadmissible under the FRE “lack[ed] merit” because courts may rely on otherwise 
inadmissible evidence); Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, L.L.C.,  
No. Civ.A. 302CV2518-G, 2003 WL 23175432, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2003) (“[B]ecause the court 
is permitted to give weight to otherwise inadmissible evidence when considering an application for 
a preliminary injunction, Half Price’s motion to exclude the Gelb Report is denied.”); Greenpeace 
Found. v. Daley, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (D. Haw. 2000) (“Even assuming portions of  
Mr. Karnella’s declaration are offered in violation of Rule 702, they need not be stricken. The Court 
considers the declaration in its entirety, and accords it the weight that is appropriate in light of Plaintiffs’ 
objections.”); see also Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1181–83, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(applying Daubert nominally, but admitting expert declaration despite serious problems with reliability, 
and ultimately giving report “very little weight” as it “misrepresents the Standards of Care; 
overwhelmingly relies on generalizations about gender dysphoric prisoners, rather than an 
individualized assessment of Norsworthy; contains illogical inferences; and admittedly includes 
references to a fabricated anecdote”). 
102. See, e.g., A.A. v. Raymond, No. 2:13-cv-01167-KJM-EFB, 2013 WL 3816565, at *4  
(E.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (“[A] trial court may admit expert testimony for purposes of 
a preliminary injunction evidentiary hearing and conduct its Daubert analysis in tandem with its 
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practice in bench trials, where courts regularly take expert testimony and then, once 
they have heard it, decide whether it satisfies the requirements of Daubert.103 
A substantial number of courts, however, have applied Daubert at the 
preliminary injunction phase.104 On occasion, judges have even deemed experts 
unqualified to testify at this stage and excluded their testimony.105 What 
distinguishes these cases from the cases that decline to apply Daubert? In none of 
the cited cases did the court consider whether the Rule should not apply at the 
preliminary injunction phase. From all appearances, it seems that one party moved 
to exclude the witness’s testimony, the other party responded with its own Daubert 
arguments, and the court resolved the evidentiary dispute under Rule 702. 
A similar dynamic has played out with Rule 408, which excludes statements 
made during settlement negotiations for purposes of proving the validity or amount 
 
assessment of the evidence’s weight. . . . Even in these cases, the court must still conduct 
the Daubert analysis and make an explicit finding of the expert testimony’s reliability . . . .”); Oklahoma 
ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 2008 WL 4453098, at *4  
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2008) (“Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the Court concludes that 
the testimony and conclusions of expert witnesses Harwood and Olsen presented at the hearing are not 
sufficiently reliable under the standards enunciated in Daubert.”); cf. Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell 
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 418, 436–37 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Upon a motion for a preliminary injunction a 
court must be guided by the evidentiary principles which would apply at trial and govern the 
admissibility of evidence, including in the form of expert testimony. . . . While ultimately the extent, if 
any, of expert testimony to be permitted from Mr. McGlynn will be a determination for the trial court, 
I have treated portions of his affidavit which appear to be more in the nature of a legal conclusion as a 
memorandum, with no particular evidentiary value.”). 
103. See Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although 
we have held that the court in a bench trial need not make [Daubert] reliability determinations before 
evidence is presented . . . the determinations must still be made at some point.”). 
104. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 783 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
district judge’s decision to admit the expert testimony of Dr. David Lodge . . . reflects a proper 
application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.”); FTC v. BF Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815-BCW, 2014 
WL 7238080, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014); Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharm., Inc.,  
No. SA-00-CA-726-PM, 2002 WL 34364150, at *5 n.17 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2002) (“In connection with 
the consideration of his testimony and the survey for purposes of the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law entered on preliminary injunctive relief, because Mr. Johnson’s testimony and survey was the 
subject of a Daubert challenge, the Court entered Daubert findings.”); Charter Nat’l Bank  
& Tr. v. Charter One Fin., Inc., No. 01 C 0905, 2001 WL 1035721, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2001) (“[W]e 
cannot find Professor Lichtman qualified as an expert.”); CBS, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 9 
F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (evaluating expert testimony under Rule 703 while not 
countenancing a hearsay objection); A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 980  
F. Supp. 962, 973 n.6 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying Daubert to social science testimony relating to the 
burden of abortion laws); Transcript of Record at 35, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-0665-F, 2014 WL 
7671680 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014) (“The Tenth Circuit has made it very clear that once a Daubert 
challenge is filed, the Court must make its findings on the record indicating its resolution of the  
Daubert challenge.”). 
105. United States v. Prater, No. CIV8:002CV2052T23MSS, 2002 WL 32107640, at *3 n.2 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2002) (“Because Mr. Rose qualifies neither as a lay witness under Rule 701 nor as 
an expert witness under Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, Mr. Rose’s testimony and the instructional 
video are excluded.”); Charter Nat’l Bank & Tr., 2001 WL 1035721, at *6 (excluding testimony after 
noting, “[a]s a trial court, we must function as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect to the screening of expert 
testimony in order to assure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony”). 
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of a disputed claim or impeaching a witness.106 Unlike the rule against hearsay or 
Daubert, Rule 408 does not primarily police evidentiary reliability; instead, it serves 
to promote desired behavior: free discussion during settlement.107 If courts may 
consider statements made during settlement negotiations at the preliminary 
injunction stage, that would undermine the incentives created by the Rule. However, 
some courts have suggested that even this Rule might not apply in the preliminary 
injunction context,108 or they have declined to apply the Rule but then given the 
evidence no weight, so as not to deter settlement talks.109 But again, courts 
sometimes do not consider whether the FRE apply at this stage: instead, they simply 
address Rule 408 motions as they arise.110 
It seems, then, that courts follow one of three practices: they acknowledge that 
the FRE don’t apply at this stage and accept all evidence; they acknowledge that the 
FRE don’t apply, accept all evidence, and then explicitly decline to give significant 
weight to inadmissible or unreliable evidence; or they do not consider whether the 
FRE applies and decide to admit or exclude evidence based on the  
parties’ arguments. 
This final practice suggests that the standard-setting court of appeals decisions 
do not fully represent actual court practice. The next Section discusses how 
preliminary injunction practice may look different on the ground than it does in the 
circuit-level case law. 
3. Unreported Court Practice 
I spoke with several federal judges who handle preliminary injunction motions 
to get a better understanding of how these hearings work in practice. Our 
conversations suggested that procedures between courts differ, although some 
common themes emerged. 
 
106. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
107. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to proposed rule (“[A] more consistently 
impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement  
of disputes.”). 
108. See, e.g., Doe #1 ex rel. Lee v. Sevier Cty., No. 3:17-CV-41, 2017 WL 1026491, at *4  
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2017) (“For the Court to accommodate John Does’ request under Rule 408, it 
would need far more in the way of specifics, and that is only if the Court assumes the Federal Rules of 
Evidence even remotely apply to the evidentiary hearing—an issue that John Does, again, have left 
unaddressed.”); cf. Jackson v. N’Genuity Enters. Co., No. 09 C 6010, 2011 WL 4628683, at *23  
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2011) (suggesting that the rule against character evidence does not apply in  
this context). 
109. See USA Visionary Concepts, L.L.C. v. MR Int’l L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-00874-DGK, 2009 
WL 10672094, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2009). 
110. See, e.g., R.G.I.S. L.L.C. v. A.S.T. Inc., No. 07-10975, 2008 WL 878908, at *4  
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2008) (“[T]he Court agrees that Rule 408 prohibits the use of the Agreement to 
prove liability, and therefore that the preliminary injunction should not issue at this time . . . .”); 
Seroctin Research & Techs., Inc. v. Unigen Pharm., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 n.1 (D. Utah 2008) 
(granting in part a motion to strike evidence under Rule 408). 
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A major difference—even among these five judges from within three 
circuits—was how quickly the court tends to hold the hearing and, relatedly, what 
kind of evidence predominates. One judge tended to move more quickly—often 
asking the parties to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a hearing 
on a temporary restraining order.111 She said she encourages affidavit  
evidence—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(c) allows judges to hear motions on 
affidavits—as opposed to live testimony.112 Another judge, who was unlikely to 
consolidate the motions, said she typically takes affidavits as direct evidence but 
requires the affiants to be present at the preliminary injunction hearing and available 
for cross-examination.113 A magistrate judge—who usually hears preliminary 
injunction motions after a temporary restraining order is already in place—said 
parties often want discovery before the preliminary injunction hearing, and the 
hearing tends to look more like a trial on the merits, with live testimony and  
cross-examination.114 She said she rarely, if ever, decides preliminary injunctions  
on affidavits.115 
The judges generally said they entertained evidentiary objections, including 
hearsay objections.116 (One speculated that lawyers may incorrectly believe that the 
FRE apply, and that’s why they make objections under the rules.117) The judge 
whose hearings look more like trials tended to apply the FRE fairly strictly,118 but 
the other judges overwhelmingly said they tended to be more lenient in this 
context,119 particularly if any flaws in the evidence could be fixed at trial.120 They 
said that clearly inadmissible evidence, such as an affidavit with no foundation, 
would not be allowed.121 But they generally allow reliable evidence to come  
in—several emphasized that “reliability” is key—even if it is excludable under the 
FRE.122 They use the parties’ evidentiary objections largely to determine the 
appropriate weight of the evidence.123 For example, two judges said they do apply 
 
111. Interview with a United States District Judge within the Eighth Circuit (Oct. 27, 2017) 
[hereinafter Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview]. 
112. Id. 
113. Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22.  
114. Magistrate Judge Interview, supra note 22.  
115. Id. 
116. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Magistrate Judge Interview, supra 
note 22; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22. 
117. Interview with a United States District Judge within the Tenth Circuit (Nov. 3, 2017) 
[hereinafter Tenth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview]. 
118. Magistrate Judge Interview, supra note 22. 
119. Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22. 
120. Interview with a United States District Judge within the Eighth Circuit (Oct. 13, 2017) 
[hereinafter Eighth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview]. 
121. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 
Interview, supra note 22. 
122. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Eighth Circuit District Judge 2 
Interview, supra note 120; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22; Tenth Circuit District 
Judge 2 Interview, supra note 117. 
123. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Eighth Circuit District Judge 2 
Interview, supra note 120; Tenth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview, supra note 117. 
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the Daubert standard at the preliminary injunction stage, but they tend to apply it 
after hearing the expert testimony in order to decide whether to give the testimony 
any weight.124 
These conversations suggest that preliminary injunction practice varies. Some 
judges may apply the FRE more strictly than the circuit courts suggest, while others 
have adopted a flexible practice. Certainly, none of the judges suggested preliminary 
injunctions are an evidentiary Wild West where anything goes; parties make 
evidentiary objections under the FRE, and the judges consider them, whether for 
purposes of exclusion or weight. In light of these judges’ comments and the 
published decisions, it seems that whether and how a court applies the FRE at the 
preliminary injunction stage depends on the judge, the arguments presented by the 
parties, and the exigencies of the case. Often, the court will entertain arguments, 
decline to exclude the evidence, but give the evidence little or no weight if the 
objecting party demonstrates that the evidence is unreliable or otherwise clearly 
violates the FRE.125 
II. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT PRACTICE 
This highly discretionary, somewhat variable regime is a far cry from trial 
proceedings, where the Federal Rules of Evidence govern. Although a number of 
the Rules allow for discretion in admitting evidence,126 the discretion is explicitly 
guided, and several types of evidence are excluded out of concerns of reliability and 
unfair prejudice. Is this departure from the trial norm justified? This Part critiques 
the courts of appeals’ approach to evidence in preliminary injunction motions. I 
focus on preliminary injunctions, as opposed to temporary restraining orders 
(TROs).127 TROs, also permitted by Rule 65, may be issued without notice to the 
other party based on facts stated in an affidavit. They may remain in place for no 
more than fourteen days, and they address true emergencies. Because the FRCP set 
out a specific evidentiary regime for TROs—allowing them issued on affidavits 
alone and without any adversarial testing—and because TROs address such  
time-sensitive emergencies that any evidence gathering is likely impossible, I do not 
critique Rule 65(b) here. I limit my critique to preliminary injunction motions. 
I analyze current practice from three angles: text, history, and policy. First, the 
FRE and the FRCP do not provide a clear textual basis for departure in the 
preliminary injunction context. Second, the current, flexible regime is not an 
 
124. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 
Interview, supra note 22. 
125. Another possibility is that parties may enter into agreements with each other about how to 
handle evidentiary issues during preliminary injunction proceedings. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Party 
Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1349 (2012) 
(discussing pretrial agreements to waive evidence objections). These agreements would show up in 
neither the reported caselaw nor conversations with judges. 
126. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 807. 
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
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inherent feature of equity—historically, courts of equity applied rules of  
evidence—although it is a longstanding feature of preliminary injunction practice. 
Third, the policy justifications courts have advanced to justify the departure from 
the FRE are insufficient. Courts have focused on the limited and preliminary nature 
of the remedy and the need to prevent irreparable harm under time pressure. The 
first rationale is misguided: preliminary injunctions are often powerful remedies. 
The second rationale carries more weight, but enforcing the FRE would not have 
consequences as dire as courts have suggested. To demonstrate this, I introduce the 
concept of meta-evidence—a key contribution of this Article—and demonstrate 
that much evidence that at first appears inadmissible is actually admissible under 
the FRE. 
A. The Text of the Rules 
This unregulated evidentiary regime is not specifically authorized by the FRE 
or the FRCP. Under the best textual reading of those Rules, it should probably be 
disallowed—the FRE should probably apply to preliminary injunction hearings. 
Both the FRCP and the FRE contain a provision instructing courts to interpret 
them to promote fairness, justice, efficiency, and in the case of evidence, truth 
seeking.128 Courts generally interpret both the FRCP and the FRE using the usual 
tools of statutory interpretation: examining the plain meaning of the text, and then 
often looking to advisory committee notes or other context to resolve 
ambiguities.129 This equivalence between statutes and rules has come under 
scholarly fire in the context of the FRCP, which are drafted by an advisory 
committee and typically enacted through legislative silence.130 As theories of 
statutory interpretation tend to begin from the premise of legislative supremacy, 
they do not translate to the FRCP.131 Several scholars have therefore suggested 
interpreting these Rules as though they were administrative regulations.132 However, 
for questions of law, even these proposals rely on many of the basic tools of 
statutory interpretation, including the plain meaning of text and the stated purpose 
of its drafters. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 governs the applicability of the FRE.133 
According to Rule 1101, the FRE “apply to proceedings before . . . United States 
 
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; FED. R. EVID. 102. 
129. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1989) (Federal Rules  
of Evidence). 
130. The original FRE were enacted by Congress. See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
131. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101  
MINN. L. REV. 2167, 2183 (2017). 
132. See id. at 2225; Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123,  
177 (2015). 
133. Section 101(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “These rules apply to 
proceedings in United States courts. The specific courts and proceedings to which the rules apply, along 
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district courts,”134 specifically “civil cases and proceedings.”135 The FRE, then, 
apply to both jury trials and bench trials, to both law and equity. Rule 1101(d) 
specifies “exceptions,” where the FRE do not apply, including preliminary 
questions governing admissibility, grand jury proceedings, and “miscellaneous 
proceedings such as: extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal 
summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case; 
sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering 
whether to release on bail or otherwise.”136 In addition, Rule 1101(e) permits other 
statutes or federal rules to provide for the admission or exclusion of evidence. 
A preliminary injunction proceeding is a civil proceeding before a United 
States district court, and it does not appear to fall under any of Rule 1101(d)’s 
“exceptions.” The best chance for exclusion is Rule 1101(d)(3)’s exclusion for 
 
with exceptions, are set out in Rule 1101.” FED. R. EVID. 101(a). Section 1101 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence provides, in its entirety: 
(a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before: 
• United States district courts; 
• United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges; 
• United States courts of appeals; 
• the United States Court of Federal Claims; and 
• the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. 
(b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: 
• civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; 
• criminal cases and proceedings; and 
• contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily. 
(c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding. 
(d) Exceptions. These rules—except for those on privilege—do not apply to the following: 
 (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing 
admissibility; 
 (2) grand-jury proceedings; and 
 (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: 
• extradition or rendition; 
• issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; 
• a preliminary examination in a criminal case; 
• sentencing; 
• granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and 
• considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. 
(e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may 
provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules. 
FED. R. EVID. 1101. 
134. FED. R. EVID. 1101(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings in 
United States courts. The specific courts and proceedings to which the rules apply, along with 
exceptions, are set out in Rule 1101.”). 
135. FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). Before recent amendments, Rule 1101(b) said the Rules “apply 
generally to civil actions and proceedings.” Mueller & Kirkpatrick suggested that the word “generally” 
indicated the Rules might not apply to certain motions. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD  
C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 11:3 (4th ed. 2009). But the word “generally” is no longer in 
the text. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). Even though the amendments were not supposed to effect 
substantive changes, Mueller & Kirkpatrick note that “there is but one word in the Rules (the qualifier 
‘generally’ in Rule 1101) that supports the conclusion that the Rules do not apply to such motions.” 5 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra. This thin rationale no longer applies. 
136. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d). 
First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/5/20  9:09 PM 
1352 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1331 
“miscellaneous proceedings.”137 The examples given in the list are not exhaustive, 
as indicated by the introductory phrase “such as,” which was added in the 2011 
restyling of the FRE to more accurately capture court practice.138 But under the 
principle of noscitur a sociis, “a word is known by the company it keeps,”139 and the 
phrase “miscellaneous proceedings” should be read in light of the examples that 
follow. Indeed, some courts have recognized that “the federal rule expressly 
authorizes federal courts to limit the application of the rules of evidence in situations 
that resemble the situations specified in the rule.”140 But a preliminary injunction hearing 
does not closely resemble the proceedings listed in Rule 1101(d)(3), all of which 
relate to criminal proceedings ancillary to trial. Indeed, courts have found the FRE 
not to apply to other ancillary criminal proceedings—such as supervised-release 
proceedings, hearings on transfers of criminal defendants, and hearings to 
determine whether a defendant can stand trial.141 Preliminary injunction hearings, 
as civil proceedings, are distinct.142 
The FRCP do not permit additional evidence, with one pertinent  
exception: Rule 43(c) provides that “[w]hen a motion relies on facts outside the 
record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly 
on oral testimony or on depositions.”143 This indicates that a court may, in its 
discretion, hear motions on affidavits.144 
 
137. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d).  
138. See Memorandum from Daniel Capra, Reporter, Evidence Rules Comm., to Advisory 
Comm. on Evidence Rules, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 235–36 (Apr. 23–24, 
2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/15559/download [https://perma.cc/P3HJ-JDYT] (noting 
that “there are a number of proceedings not on the list in which courts have held that the rules are not 
applicable,” including “supervised release revocation proceedings and proceedings to determine 
whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult”). Deborah Jones Merritt notes that before the restyling, 
some courts interpreted Rule 1101(d)(3) as an exhaustive list, and she argues that the addition of “such 
as” may have changed the substance of the Rule. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Social Media, the Sixth 
Amendment, and Restyling: Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Evidence, 28 TOURO L. REV. 27, 
32–36 (2012). 
139. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015). 
140. Parker v. State, 769 S.E.2d 329, 334 (Ga. 2015) (emphasis added). 
141. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 8077 n.9; see also 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 135, § 11:5 (citing other criminal proceedings in which the Rules do not apply under Rule 
1101(d)(3)). 
142. There is some resemblance between a preliminary injunction hearing and a bail  
hearing: the court determines whether to burden the defendant in order to prevent pre-trial harm. 
However, bail hearings occur on a tighter timeframe, often within twenty-four hours of arrest, giving 
the defendant little time to prepare. See 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8 (4th ed. 2015). Bail hearings more closely resemble ex parte temporary 
restraining order proceedings than preliminary injunction hearings. Cf. Russell M. Gold, Jail as 
Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501 (2019) (arguing that pretrial detention determinations should be made 
under a standard akin to the preliminary injunction standard). 
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c). 
144. The court may also use deposition transcripts, which are admissible at trial only under 
certain circumstances. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a). This rarely comes up at preliminary injunction hearings, 
likely because there has typically been insufficient time for discovery at this point, and because the  
non-offering party either had the opportunity to examine the deponent or to supplement with  
an affidavit. 
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Rule 65, which governs preliminary injunction motions, does not expressly 
permit otherwise-inadmissible evidence. But it does include one indication that 
courts might hear inadmissible evidence on a motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Rule 65(a)(2) provides, “evidence that is received on the motion and that would be 
admissible at trial becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at 
trial.”145 This suggests that some evidence received on a preliminary injunction 
motion will not be admissible at trial. However, this passage is consistent with 
allowing only the affidavits and deposition transcripts provided for in Rule 43(c). 
The advisory committee notes offer no clues. 
Courts have not seriously addressed the tension between Rule 1101 and 
declining to apply the FRE to preliminary injunction motions.146 Those that have 
noticed the tension simply use preliminary injunctions as an example of Rule 
1101(d)(3) being an inexhaustive list of exceptions.147 In one instance, a court had 
relied on Rule 1101(d)(3) to express skepticism about the inapplicability of the FRE 
to a temporary restraining order proceeding, but the judge’s skepticism was quelled 
by a citation to the case law on preliminary injunctions and hearsay.148 
And courts have taken the silence of Rule 65 to indicate a lack of restrictions 
on evidence. Whereas Rule 56, which governs motions for summary judgment, 
specifies what information is admissible—including requirements for affidavits and 
a provision for objections that evidence cannot be presented in admissible 
form149—Rule 65 does not. In G.G., the Fourth Circuit cited this comparison to 
demonstrate that preliminary injunctions are governed by a laxer evidentiary 
regime,150 as has the Third Circuit.151 Wright and Miller suggest that it would be 
illogical to impose the strict standards of Rule 56 on preliminary injunction 
motions.152 While I agree with these courts that nothing in the Rules requires that 
affidavits on a preliminary injunction motion conform to Rule 56(c)(4), this does 
not in itself imply that the Rules of Evidence as a whole do not apply. Rather, it 
means only that affidavits submitted pursuant to Rule 43(c) are not specifically 
governed by Rule 56(c)(4). This does create a tension in the Rules, as Rule 56(c)(4) 
 
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (a)(2). 
146. A Westlaw search for “1101(d)!” /p “preliminary injunction!” yields three district court 
cases. THOMSON REUTUERS WESTLAW EDGE, https://www.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/TT6N-
MV4V] (search “1101(d)!” /p “preliminary injunction!” in the search bar using all state and  
federal filters). 
147. See Forsberg v. Pefanis, 261 F.R.D. 694, 700 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (discussing Arista Records 
L.L.C. v. Does 1–27, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D. Me. 2008)); Arista Records, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56 
(citing Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986)). 
148. See Occupy Denver v. City of Denver, No. 11-cv-03048-REB-MJWW, 2011 WL 6096501, 
at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Dec. 7, 2011) (citing Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182 (10th  
Cir. 2003)). 
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
150. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 2016). 
151. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718–19 (3d Cir. 2004). 
152. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949; see also J.P. Morgan Sec. L.L.C. v. Manne,  
No. 16-818-JWD-RLB, 2016 WL 7223358, at *2 (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2016) (order granting temporary 
restraining order) (“The Fifth Circuit follows Wright & Miller.”). 
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effectively requires the affiant’s statements to conform to the Rules of Evidence. 
But the tension does not suggest a clear resolution in favor of admissibility. 
This rejection of the FRE without explicit authorization is not unique to 
preliminary injunction motions: courts have also rejected application of the FRE to 
class certification proceedings pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, even though those are also civil proceedings not excepted under Rule 
1101(d).153 Linda Mullenix has argued that evidentiary rules should apply to these 
proceedings, in part on this textual basis.154 Perhaps the most forceful call for the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to apply to preliminary injunction motions under Rules 101 
and 1101 has come in a parenthetical in a Chamber of Commerce amicus brief to 
the Supreme Court calling for application of the FRE in class certification 
proceedings. In its brief, the Chamber stated, “Although Rule 1101(d) contains 
certain enumerated exceptions to that general principle, it contains no exception for 
class-certification proceedings, or for the many other types of civil pretrial 
proceedings (such as preliminary-injunction hearings) at which parties routinely 
present evidence.”155 The brief called the conclusion that the Rules apply to class 
certification proceedings “inescapable” “[a]s a logical matter.”156 
Textually, the FRE and FRCP do not provide for a wholesale rejection of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in the context of preliminary injunction motions. Instead 
they provide for a narrow exception: affidavits and depositions. Courts have not 
been convinced by the text, however, so I turn to history and policy. 
B. Historical Context 
The Supreme Court has indicated that “history is a crucial guidepost in 
evaluating the scope of federal equitable power.”157 Courts have looked to the equity 
tradition to emphasize that the judge, sitting as chancellor, has broad discretion and 
flexibility in determining what relief is appropriate.158 Law and equity have 
 
153. See Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class 
Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 606, 636–37 (2014). 
154. See id. 
155. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Business 
Roundtable, and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 6, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 3643755. 
156. Id. 
157. Lee, supra note 49, at 125; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 
527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999) (“Because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity, 
we hold that the District Court had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners 
from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of respondents’ contract claim for money 
damages.”); see also Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive 
Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 53 (2011) (“Thus, a static, historical 
conception of equity drives the substantive standards for deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.”). 
In his concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Thomas relied heavily on the history of equity to discuss 
the scope of the injunctive remedy. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425–29 (2018) (Thomas,  
J., concurring). 
158. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 310 (1982) (noting the district court 
had “emphasized an equity court’s traditionally broad discretion”). 
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merged,159 and the Rules govern all cases, but courts still sometimes invoke 
equitable tradition and custom when discussing procedural issues.160 Equity 
historically focused on considerations of justice and fairness.161 If nineteenth-
century courts of equity162 had unlimited flexibility with regard to evidentiary issues, 
that might suggest that today’s courts considering equitable remedies should 
similarly be free to ignore all constraints and do justice in every case. 
Although courts of chancery had more evidentiary flexibility than courts of 
law, they were hardly unconstrained. The evidentiary regime in early equity courts 
may have resembled the civilian law of proof more than the common law.163 But 
even in that early period, judges in equity were apparently bound by the rules as they 
existed.164 Later, the evidentiary rules of equity and common law converged in many 
respects, although practice never aligned precisely.165 “The rules as to evidence are 
the same in equity as at law,” declared Lord Hardwicke in 1737.166 He later noted 
that having different evidentiary regimes in the two courts could have “mischievous 
consequence,” as it could lead to different results on the same issue in different 
courts.167 This maxim held across the Pond, as well. In the United States, the 
evidentiary rules in equity differed from those at law in only a limited class of 
cases,168 and equity treatises repeated the maxim, “In general it may be stated that 
the rules of evidence are the same in equity as they are at law.”169 
 
159. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2. This is not to imply that law conquered equity. See generally Stephen 
N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
160. See, e.g., Univ. of. Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“[A] preliminary injunction 
is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete 
than in a trial on the merits.”) (emphasis added); Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 
111; see also Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 870 (2011). 
161. See Subrin, supra note 159, at 919. 
162. When the Supreme Court looks at historical rules of equity, it tends to “draw from the 
equity of the middle-to-late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century[,]” as that is the period 
“when those rules were most systematically expounded.” Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the 
New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1022 (2015). Bray argues that pulling from this convenient period 
is not good academic history, but it is sensible history in the context of legal adjudication. Id. at 1001. 
Since courts look to this period, and since this period runs directly into the era governed by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, I focus on it as the most sensible reference point. 
163. See MICHAEL R. T. MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY 14,  
35 (1999). 
164. Id. at 294. 
165. See RICHARD NEWCOMBE GRESLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE 
COURTS OF EQUITY 1 (Christopher Alderson Calvert ed., 1847) (“Evidence in the Courts of Equity, 
although materially differing in its character and many of its rules from that which is used in the Courts 
of Common Law . . . .”). 
166. Manning v. Lechmere (1737) 26 Eng. Rep. 288, 288; 1 Atk. 453, 453. 
167. See Glynn v. Bank of England (1750) 26 Eng. Rep. 26, 27–28; 2 Ves. Sen. 38, 41. 
168. Man v. Ward (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 541; 2 Atk. 228; Glynn 26 Eng. Rep. at 28; 2 Ves. at 42; 
3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 250 (16th ed. 1899). 
169. 3 JOSEPH STORY & W.H. LYON, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 564 (14th ed. 1918); see also JOHN ADAMS, THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AS ADMINISTERED BY THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY 44 (8th ed. 1890) (“The general rules of evidence are the same in equity as at law, but the 
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The evidentiary regimes of law and equity differed in two important respects. 
First, while parties were not competent to testify in courts of law, plaintiffs and 
defendants could submit testimony in courts of equity.170 Second, the manner of 
taking the evidence differed: in legal cases, tried in front of a jury, the witnesses gave 
live testimony, whereas at equity, the evidence was taken in secret via written 
interrogatories.171 In equity courts, the evidence was all disclosed simultaneously at 
the moment of “publication,” after which no further evidence was admissible 
without special leave.172 (In complicated cases, the court might assign a “master,” 
who could seek out additional evidence from the parties.173 The master might take 
testimony by oral examination with the parties present.174) This practice evolved 
over time—the Federal Equity Rules of 1842 allowed parties to consent to an 
evidence-taking procedure more like a deposition than a written interrogatory.175 
But federal judges sitting in equity relied on written evidence—interrogatories, 
transcripts, pleadings, and written documentation176—until the New Federal Equity 
Rules went into effect in 1913.177 Even after 1913, courts continued to hear motions 
on affidavits at the preliminary injunction stage.178 
The written nature of the evidence at equity does not suggest a major 
breakdown in the rules; rather, courts distinguished between the rules of evidence 
and the mode or manner of taking evidence.179 As the central purpose of taking 
evidence in equity was “to elicit a sworn detail of facts on which the court may 
adjudge the equities,” not to resolve conflicts between witnesses, written 
interrogatories sufficed as a manner of taking evidence.180 But the difference in 
 
manner of taking it is different.”); C.L. BATES, FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE (1901) (“It is a 
fundamental principle that courts of equity follow the common-law rules of evidence . . . .”); 3 
GREENLEAF, supra note 168, § 250 (“The rules of Evidence, as to the matter of fact, as Lord Hardwicke 
long since remarked, are generally the same in equity as at law.”). 
170. STORY & LYON, supra note 169, at 564. 
171. See ADAMS, supra note 169, at 44–45, 365. 
172. See id. at 45. 
173. See AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877, at 26, 52 (2017). 
174. See id. at 82–83, 87; Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due 
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1226 (2005) 
(citing Rule 77 of the Federal Equity Rules of 1842). 
175. See FED. EQUITY R. 67 (1842) (repealed in 1938 with the adoption of the FRCP), in JAMES 
LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 119–20 (7th ed. 1930); Kessler, supra note 174, 
at 1230–31. 
176. See KESSLER, supra note 173, at 70–71; Kessler, supra note 174, at 1232. 
177. HOPKINS, supra note 175, at 240 (reproducing Federal Rule of Equity 46, which read, “In 
all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise 
provided by statute or these rules . . . .” and noting that the rule was new). Beginning in 1893, the court 
could, in its discretion, allow testimony to be received in open court. But that was not the default 
practice. See Kessler, supra note 174, at 1232–33. 
178. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 55, 67–68 (1930). 
179. See Charles C. Callahan & Edwin E. Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 622, 625 n.13 (1936) (citing first Bryant v. Leyland, 6 F. 125, 127 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1881); and then citing Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 F. 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1909)). 
180. ADAMS, supra note 169, at 45. 
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manner of taking evidence did not alter other evidence rules, such as competency.181 
The system of gathering evidence differed greatly between the two systems; the rules 
of evidence differed far less. 
The rule against hearsay applied in English equity courts, as well as in common 
law, by the mid-nineteenth century.182 The rule was relatively late to develop: it did 
not apply with rigor in either law or equity during most of their separate existence. 
A few early equity cases suggest that hearsay is different from sworn testimony, and 
courts should give it little, if any, weight.183 Other cases indicate that a witness must 
testify on the basis of his knowledge, not merely his belief.184 But the exclusionary 
rule against hearsay likely did not solidify until around the late eighteenth or early 
nineteenth century—until then, use of hearsay was apparently within the court’s 
discretion, even at English common law.185 
Also, there was some additional flexibility in equity, beyond that at law. One 
treatise notes that if it would be “inconvenient and unreasonably expensive” to 
produce evidence in the regular manner in a court of equity, the court could allow 
the normally inadmissible evidence by special order.186 
And at least by the mid-nineteenth century, American equity courts did allow 
additional flexibility at preliminary injunction proceedings. One court noted 
specifically that “[u]pon the hearing of a motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
rules of evidence are applied less strictly than upon the final hearing of the cause, 
and consequently evidence that would not be competent in support of an 
application for a perpetual injunction should be admitted.”187 
The rules of evidence at equity, then, contained more flexibility than the rules 
of evidence at law, and the manner of taking evidence was different; but courts still 
faced constraints and largely adhered to the rules. However, courts do have a long 
 
181. Manning v. Lechmere (1737) 26 Eng. Rep. 288, 288; 1 Atk. 453, 453. 
182. See GRESLEY, supra note 165, at 304 (“Hearsay is inadmissible . . . .”). I have not found a 
treatise on either 19th Century American equity or 19th Century American evidence that discusses 
whether the rule against hearsay applied at equity. 
183. See MACNAIR, supra note 163, at 260 (quoting Bath & Montague’s Case (1693) 22 Eng. 
Rep. 963, 1002; 3 Ch. Cas. 54, 119 (Somers, LK) (“[T]here is no Proof of it; it is at most but an  
Hear-say, testified by one Witness.”)). 
184. See id. 
185. John H. Langbein, The Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the 
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1201 (1996); T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 
84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 530–37 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, The Mold that Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 433, 437 n.18 (2014). 
186. 3 GREENLEAF, supra note 168, § 340. 
187. Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 F. 135, 147 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891) 
(noting that evidence was not hearsay and that even if it were, the rules apply less strictly in this context); 
see also Green v. City of Lynn, 55 F. 516, 518 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) (“[T]his question did not arise on a 
motion for an ad interim injunction, with reference to which the rules of evidence are not strict, but are 
molded to meet the convenience of a summary hearing.”); Buck v. Hermance, 4 F. Cas. 548, 549 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (noting that while a verdict from one case could not be admitted as evidence in 
another lawsuit, it could be admitted in a preliminary injunction proceeding, because “[i]n this 
preliminary proceeding the parties are not tied down to the strict rules of evidence”). 
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history of flexibility at the preliminary injunction stage, which suggests a need for at 
least some relief from the FRE at this stage. To see when that is and isn’t necessary, 
I turn to policy. 
C. Policy Justifications 
Courts have advanced two central reasons for permitting inadmissible 
evidence in preliminary injunction proceedings: the provisional nature and limited 
purpose of the remedy, and the need to prevent irreparable harm given time 
constraints. I discuss both. First, I argue that the provisional-and-limited rationale 
is unconvincing: preliminary injunctions are often highly consequential, and any 
suggestion that evidentiary regulation is unimportant because the findings are 
unimportant is misguided. Second, I agree that the need to prevent irreparable harm 
before the parties have had a full opportunity for discovery is a weighty concern 
that requires compromising the FRE to some degree. However, I demonstrate that 
applying the FRE would not be as harmful as courts have suggested. To make this 
showing, I introduce the concept of “meta-evidence”—evidence demonstrating 
what evidence will be presented at trial. By recognizing that evidence going to 
likelihood of success on the merits is meta-evidence, we see that the FRE would 
exclude little evidence on this important factor. 
1. Provisional Nature and Limited Purpose of Remedy 
In University of Texas v. Camenisch, the Supreme Court case that served as the 
basis for many of the circuit cases allowing hearsay,188 the court emphasized that 
“[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions 
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”189 It reasoned that “[g]iven this 
limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to 
be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that 
are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.”190 Wright 
and Miller note that on motions for summary judgment, it is important to impose 
the same evidentiary safeguards that exist at trial because summary judgment is a 
substitute for trial. In the preliminary injunction context, however, the order “only 
has the effect of maintaining the positions of the parties until the trial can be held; 
the order neither replaces the trial nor represents an adjudication of the merits.”191 
 
188. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 
47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 
718 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390); Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 
1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390). 
189. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. 
190. Id. (emphasis added). 
191. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949; see also Mullins v. City of New York, 634  
F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy, and the 
burdensome requirements of trial testimony are at odds with its provisional purpose.”). Note that the 
preliminary injunction in Mullins was truly provisional, as it enjoined penalizing participation in the suit. 
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This emphasis on preliminary injunctions as a device that merely preserves the 
status quo has a long history192 that continues to present day,193 but as several 
scholars have demonstrated,194 it is incomplete. Preliminary injunctions sometimes, 
but do not always, preserve the status quo, the existing state of things. Instead, 
courts often focus on minimizing or avoiding irreparable harm,195 and “[i]f the 
currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it 
is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury . . . .”196 In the travel 
ban cases, for example, courts preliminarily enjoined an executive order that was 
already in effect.197 In Camenisch itself,198 the district court’s preliminary injunction 
ordered the defendant university to provide an interpreter for the plaintiff, a deaf 
student, to assist him in his classes. That, too, disrupted the status quo: the status 
quo was Walter Camenisch being disadvantaged in class. On the other hand, the 
plaintiff would have lost his job if he could not take classes at the university,199 so 
in another sense, the order maintained the status quo. Several circuit courts have 
adopted a preliminary injunction standard that holds a movant to a higher burden 
if the requested injunction would disturb the status quo or is mandatory (requiring 
action), as opposed to prohibitory (forbidding action).200 Although this standard 
favors status-quo-preserving injunctions, it also acknowledges that preliminary 
injunctions will not always preserve the status quo. 
Some courts have attempted to evade the potentially harmful nature of the 
status quo by defining it as “the last peaceable, noncontested status of the 
parties.”201 But in a number of cases—think of Gavin Grimm trying to use the boys’ 
room or Walter Camenisch seeking an interpreter—there is no “peaceable, 
noncontested” state of affairs to which the parties can revert. And even if a court 
leaves a relatively peaceable current state of affairs unchanged, “a court interferes 
just as much when it orders the status quo preserved as when it changes it.”202 
 
192. See WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY 11–12 (1871) (“The effect and object of the interlocutory injunction is merely 
to preserve the property in dispute in statu quo until the hearing or further order.”); Lee, supra note 49, 
at 124–38. 
193. See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390). 
194. See Lee, supra note 49, at 140–43 (discussing “mandatory” injunctions that altered the status 
quo in Nineteenth Century America); Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 546. 
195. See James T. Carney, Rule 65 and Judicial Abuse of Power: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 
19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 88–89 (1995); Lee, supra note 49, at 163. 
196. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974). 
197. See, e.g., Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
198. Camenisch v. Univ. of Tex., No. A-78-CA-061, 1978 WL 51 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1978), 
vacated in part sub nom., Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390; Camenisch v. Univ. of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 129 (5th  
Cir. 1980), vacated in part sub nom., Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390. 
199. Camenisch, 1978 WL 51, at *2 (noting “the state requirement that Plaintiff obtain his 
Master’s degree, and the potential irreparable injury resulting from Plaintiff’s loss of employment”). 
200. Lee, supra note 49, at 115–21. 
201. Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:19 (2d ed. 1984)); 
see also Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1058 (1965). 
202. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 546. 
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Preventing an important change can be a large imposition. And while a preliminary 
injunction is not permanent, it can be in place for years while a lawsuit is pending. 
In patent infringement cases, defendants have noted that while a final order 
requiring them to obtain a license before producing a product would be a blow, an 
interim prohibition on production is much worse.203 The notion that the stakes are 
somehow lower because a preliminary injunction classically preserves the status quo 
is off base. 
Relatedly, in contrast to some courts’ suggestion that the preliminary 
injunction is merely an interim remedy, the decision on the preliminary injunction 
motion can have significant downstream consequences.204 While judges may, of 
course, change their conclusions after a trial on the merits—findings on a 
preliminary injunction motion are indeed preliminary—the suggestion that 
preliminary injunction determinations are categorically less important or 
consequential than trial findings is unjustified.205 
Preliminary injunction decisions may effectively resolve a case—particularly 
when timing is key to the parties’ interests. For example, if an employer seeks to 
enjoin a former employee from going to a competitor and divulging a trade secret, 
the preliminary injunction decision may render further proceedings moot. If the 
injunction is denied, the trade secret will be divulged, so a permanent injunction 
would be useless; if the preliminary injunction is granted, the protected information 
may well lose its value before a trial on the merits, so the defendant’s interest in the 
information will be lost.206 In Gavin Grimm’s case, the Supreme Court stayed the 
preliminary injunction issued in his favor,207 vacating and remanding only after most 
of his senior year had passed.208 Grimm graduated without ever being permitted to 
use the boys’ bathroom.209 And consider labor injunctions—an historically 
significant breed of injunction that is less prominent today, thanks to New Deal 
 
203. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 573, 574 (2001) (quoting the CEO of Napster). 
204. See id. at 573 (“[P]ractitioner accounts suggest that injunctions have substantial effects on 
the outcome of disputes.”). 
205. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 178, at 78–80 (noting that while, in the labor 
dispute context, courts have granted preliminary injunctions while doubtful about the facts because the 
injunction “does not pass finally on the merits,” that “rationale must be rejected” because “the 
preliminary injunction in the main determines and terminates the controversy in court”). 
206. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the 
relevant trade secret as “extensive and intimate knowledge about PCNA’s strategic goals for 1995 in 
sports drinks and new age drinks”). 
207. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16A52, 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442  
(2016) (mem.). 
208. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16-273, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239  
(2017) (mem.). 
209. His suit continues, seeking nominal damages and a declaratory judgment. See Matt Stevens, 
Transgender Student in Bathroom Dispute Wins Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/gavin-grimm-transgender-bathrooms.html [https://perma.cc/
K9SV-6KCF]. 
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legislation protecting the right to strike.210 Because strikes are so time sensitive,211 a 
preliminary injunction enjoining a strike may spur the workers to abort their efforts 
entirely.212 As Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene put it, “it is undeniably the fact 
that the preliminary injunction in the main determines and terminates the 
controversy in court.”213 
Even if a preliminary injunction decision does not end a case, it may heavily 
influence the judge’s ultimate ruling on the case.214 Kevin Lynch has addressed how 
the psychological “lock-in effect” applies to preliminary injunction 
determinations.215 Psychological research has shown that decisionmakers “lock in” 
to an initial decision and are reluctant to change their decision when asked to revisit 
it.216 This effect is particularly strong when a judge’s decision allows irreparable 
harm to occur: the judge will then face both “internal and external pressures to 
justify the harm,” and will be less likely to alter his decision later.217 Therefore, when 
a judge grants or denies a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of success 
on the merits and irreparable harm occurs, the judge may be highly unlikely to 
change his view of the merits.218 
In addition, settlement negotiations occur in the shadow of a preliminary 
injunction decision.219 The decision severely alters the bargaining positions of the 
 
210. See Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29  
U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2012)) (prohibiting preliminary injunctions in labor cases, except as permitted by 
law); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29  
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1994)). Employers do still move to enjoin strikes today, particularly in the 
transportation industry, thanks to the Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 1120, 64 Stat. 1238. See, e.g.,  
A.B.X. Air, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 1:16-cv-1096, 2016 WL 7117388 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 
2016); Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Division/IBT v. B.N.S.F. Ry., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1208  
(C.D. Cal. 2015). 
211. See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor’s Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.  
& EMP. L. 283, 327 (2006) (“The timing of a strike at the most inopportune time for the employer is a 
major source of the economic leverage the union gains in striking.”); Jon R. Kerian, Injunctions in Labor 
Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 37 N.D. L. REV. 49, 51 (1961) (“[S]trikes are usually 
won or lost within a few days . . . .”). 
212. See Kerian, supra note 211, at 52 (“Once the injunction was granted, the strikers’ ferv[o]r 
was abated and the strike was lost.”); Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92  
N.Y.U. L. REV. 462, 489 (2017). 
213. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 178, at 80. 
214. See Kenneth R. Berman, Litigating Preliminary Injunctions: Sudden Injustice on a Half-Baked 
Record, 15 PRAC. LITIGATOR 31, 33 (2004) (“As a practical matter, the decision on the preliminary 
injunction motion is often case dispositive.”). 
215. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779 (2014). 
216. Id. at 781. 
217. Id. 
218. Lynch focuses on denial of preliminary injunction. However, because granting a 
preliminary injunction may also allow irreparable harm to occur, as discussed infra Section II.C.2., his 
reasoning could also apply to decisions in which a judge grants the remedy and permits harm. Lynch 
also suggests that the standard for “likelihood of success” on the merits is functionally the same as the 
ultimate burden of proof. Lynch, supra note 215, at 798. I disagree with this in the next section. 
219. But see Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 195 (2010) 
(suggesting preliminary injunction decisions give too weak a signal as to likelihood of success on  
the merits). 
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parties, and parties often settle after a preliminary injunction decision.220 The 
preliminary injunction, then, is the final ruling the parties receive from the judge, 
and it in effect resolves the dispute. 
Courts have sometimes recognized—and sometimes declined to 
acknowledge—the potential effective finality of preliminary injunction 
determinations. Some judges, like Jerome Frank, have emphasized that “a 
preliminary injunction—as indicated by the numerous more or less synonymous 
adjectives used to label it—is, by its very nature, interlocutory, tentative, provisional, 
ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not fixed or final or conclusive, characterized 
by its for-the-time-beingness.”221 Others have acknowledged that “a preliminary 
injunction is somewhat like a judgment and execution before trial.”222 In the Ninth 
Circuit, parties looking to seal documents have to make a lesser showing “when 
those materials are used in connection with a non-dispositive motion.”223 While 
acknowledging that preliminary injunction motions are technically non-dispositive, 
that court has deemed them “dispositive” for this purpose in part because they “go 
to the heart of the case,”224 “may even, as a practical matter, determine the outcome 
of a case,”225 and “are so significant, they are one of the few categories of motions 
that may be heard as interlocutory appeals.”226 
Both perspectives are, in a way, correct. Findings made for purposes of a 
preliminary injunction order are subject to change—the order is not a final 
judgment on the merits—but the decision can have enormous consequences both 
in the long term and the short term. The importance of the preliminary injunction 
motion suggests that courts should, at the very least, take evidentiary issues seriously 
at this stage.227 
 
220. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (1993) 
(“Chancellor Allen said to me that almost none of his cases get to final judgment—that he grants or 
denies the preliminary injunction and then the case settles.”); Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the 
Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197, 202 n.14 (2003) (noting that preliminary hearings 
inform parties of how the judge is thinking about the case); Julie S. Turner, Comment, The 
Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 205 
(1998) (noting, in the patent context, “[t]he grant or denial of a preliminary injunction has a very 
powerful impact on settlement”); cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 547 (“More detailed analysis at the 
interlocutory stage . . . would also provide the parties with a prediction of the final outcome that could 
ease settlement.”). 
221. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953). 
222. Herman v. Dixon, 141 A.2d 576, 577 (Pa. 1958) (opinion of Justice Herbert Cohen). 
223. Quest Integrity USA, L.L.C. v. A.Hak Indus. Servs. US, L.L.C., No. C14-1971RAJ, 2015 
WL 4495283, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2015). 
224. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., L.L.C., 809 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016). 
225. Id. at 1099. 
226. Id. 
227. Cf. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 632 (“Once the serious consequences of class certification 
are embraced, it follows that all actors involved should be required to produce and secure as reliable a 
record as necessary to ensure that a court has appropriate information upon which to make a serious 
class certification decision.”). 
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2. Equity Under Pressure 
Courts have also reasoned that the need to prevent irreparable harm under 
tight time constraints justifies a lax evidentiary regime. In Camenisch, the Supreme 
Court cited “the haste that is often necessary”228 on preliminary injunction motions 
as a reason for informality. Wright and Miller similarly say Rule 56(c)(4) constraints 
should not apply to affidavits on preliminary injunctions because “the urgency that 
necessitates a prompt determination of the preliminary-injunction application may 
make it more difficult to obtain affidavits from people who are competent to testify 
at trial.”229 And because the decision to grant a preliminary injunction is 
discretionary, “the trial court should be allowed to give even inadmissible evidence 
some weight . . . in order to serve the primary purpose of preventing irreparable 
harm before a trial can be had.”230 The Ninth Circuit has justified the use of 
affidavits by the need to avoid a full hearing and “give speedy relief from irreparable 
injury,”231 a central purpose of preliminary injunctions. 
The timing problem has two related parts: the inability of litigants to discover 
the best evidence in a short timeframe,232 and the need for courts to spend less time 
on the preliminary injunction hearing than they would on a full trial.233 The second 
concern poses less of a problem. True, if the preliminary injunction is particularly 
time sensitive, the parties will likely want a hearing that lasts hours, not days or 
weeks. But permitting affidavits in lieu of live testimony, particularly on 
uncontested issues, should suffice to limit the time of the hearing. If and when a 
written statement would be more efficient than live testimony, the parties may 
submit that sworn testimony in written form. The elimination of other Federal Rules 
of Evidence will allow in more evidence, lengthening hearing time. Arguments on 
evidentiary objections could, indeed, require significant time. But they should not 
typically take up too much time: the FRE are designed to be applied quickly, in a trial 
context.234 Applying the FRE could cost time in some cases, but it could save time 
in others. 
 
228. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
229. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949. 
230. Id.; see also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 726 (4th  
Cir. 2016) (explaining that a laxer evidentiary regime “is warranted by the nature and purpose of 
preliminary injunction proceedings to prevent irreparable harm before a full trial on the merits”). 
231. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1953). 
232. See Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The urgency of 
obtaining a preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt determination and makes it difficult to obtain 
affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial.”). 
233. See Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To hold otherwise would 
be at odds with the summary nature of the remedy and would undermine the ability of courts to provide 
timely provisional relief.”); Mullins v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373, 387–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“Through affidavits and hearsay testimony, a court may maximize the breadth of evidence without 
necessitating hearings that span days or weeks. . . . In the instant case, the Court received the benefit 
of evidence of concern expressed by dozens of individually-named sergeants without the burden of a 
parade of witnesses and the loss of time by busy law enforcement officers.”). 
234. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA 
L. REV. 413, 414 (1989). 
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The first concern is more troubling: litigants may not be able to discover all 
relevant evidence in a short timeframe, so even if admissible, discoverable, and 
favorable evidence exists, they may be unable to present it. If courts are unable to 
consider inadmissible evidence, then they will have insufficient information. And 
this dearth of probative evidence increases the risk of error, so courts are more likely 
to cause or allow irreparable harm. This undermines the central purpose of the 
preliminary injunction: preventing irreparable harm pending a full trial on  
the merits. 
This is a real problem, and I discuss the precise way in which it is a real 
problem in the next Part. However, in this Section, I discuss why it’s not as serious 
a problem as some courts have suggested. First, if courts were to apply the Federal 
Rules at this stage, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 would allow judges to admit 
affidavits and deposition transcripts, which would give the court significant 
flexibility. Second, and more interestingly, by understanding that evidence 
submitted to prove likelihood of success on the merits is “meta-evidence” and need 
not be introduced to prove the merits directly, we can see that much evidence 
thought of as inadmissible is actually admissible. 
a. Affidavits Admissible 
First, affidavits would be allowed. FRCP 43(c) explicitly permits a judge to 
hear a motion on affidavits, live testimony, or deposition transcripts when that 
motion relies on information outside the record. Preliminary injunction motions fit 
the bill. This effectively creates a Rule-based exception to the rule against  
hearsay: affidavits may be considered on a motion, even though the declarant is not 
present nor subject to cross-examination. The use of affidavits allows parties to 
focus their prehearing investigation time searching for evidence that can’t be 
presented in affidavit form. 
Even this single relaxation of the FRE to allow affidavits is somewhat 
troubling. Affiants cannot be cross-examined, so courts are deprived of the 
“‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’”235 and deciding a 
motion based on affidavits alone may be inadequate.236 However, most courts will 
hold a live hearing if facts are contested.237 Many courts require a live hearing at a 
 
235. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 
(3d ed. 1940)). 
236. See 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 263 ( J.S. Mill ed., 1827) 
(“As a mode of coming at the truth of the case, where the extraction of the truth is attended with any 
considerable difficulty, nothing can be more palpably incompetent than the use of [affidavits] . . . .”). 
237. See Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]hile affidavits 
may be considered on a preliminary injunction motion, motions for preliminary injunction should not 
be resolved on the basis of affidavits that evince disputed issues of fact.”); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 29, § 2949 nn.29–48 and accompanying text (discussing the practice in different courts under 
various circumstances). 
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party’s request if the parties dispute the facts.238 If the parties would prefer to resolve 
the motion on a “battle of affidavits,” some courts will allow it.239 In sum, courts 
seem to take heed of Judge Friendly’s wisdom in SEC v. Frank,240 in which he 
advocated for tailoring the thoroughness of the preliminary injunction proceeding 
to the centrality of the factual disputes: “[W]here everything turns on what 
happened and that is in sharp dispute . . . , the inappropriateness of proceeding on 
affidavits attains its maximum . . . .”241 Courts will consider affidavits, but when the 
facts are in dispute, they will allow the parties to present additional testimony and 
challenge each other’s evidence at a live hearing. This does not eliminate the concern 
with affidavits—courts may still consider this “uninterrogated testimony”242—but 
it at least mitigates the problem by allowing some interrogation of the other  
party’s evidence. 
b. Meta-Evidence 
The second reason adhering to the FRE would not be as draconian as courts 
have suggested is that much supposedly inadmissible evidence is actually admissible 
under those Rules. To see why, we need to understand what that evidence actually 
tends to prove: evidence introduced to prove likelihood of success of the merits is 
not direct evidence of the merits—rather, it is proof of what evidence will be 
introduced at trial. I call this evidence of what is to come “meta-evidence.” This 
Subsection explains how the meta-evidence idea negates many evidentiary 
objections at the preliminary injunction stage. It then discusses meta-evidence as a 
lens through which we can view a number of procedural motions. 
i. Meta-Evidence and Likelihood of Success 
Although the preliminary injunction standard has four factors, it breaks down 
neatly into two categories: the “likelihood of success on the merits” factor and the 
harm factors—irreparable harm absent an injunction, balance of equities, and  
public interest. 
What does a plaintiff need to show to demonstrate likelihood of success? He 
does not need to preliminarily demonstrate that he should win on the merits, were 
the court to make a decision on the evidence presented now. Rather, he is tasked 
with demonstrating that when there is a trial later on, he will likely win at trial. This 
understanding accords with every theoretical discussion of the preliminary 
 
238. See Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Particularly when a court must 
make credibility determinations to resolve key factual disputes in favor of the moving party, it is an 
abuse of discretion for the court to settle the question on the basis of documents alone, without an 
evidentiary hearing.”); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949 n.43 (citing cases). 
239. See Holt v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 90 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Normally a party that 
elects to gamble on a ‘battle of affidavits’ must live by that choice.”). 
240. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). 
241. Id. at 491. 
242. 2 BENTHAM, supra note 236, at 262. 
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injunction standard. The “likelihood of success” factor involves “predicting the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case”243 and “apprais[ing] the likelihood that various views 
of the facts and the law will prevail at trial.”244 As Douglas Laycock notes, the 
relevant issue is “the probability that the preliminary relief to be granted will be a 
part of the relief to be awarded at final judgment, or at least not inconsistent with 
the rights to be determined by the final judgment.”245 In addition, a focus on 
likelihood of success at trial provides the parties with the most useful information 
for purposes of settlement negotiation.246 In practice, courts deciding preliminary 
injunction motions often simply recite a litany of factual findings without couching 
them in terms of what the parties can likely prove at trial.247 That practice clashes 
with the “likelihood of success” standard. 
For purposes of evidence, this distinction between assessing the claim on the 
evidence presented and predicting the strength of the case at trial is an important 
one: each piece of evidence is not being introduced to prove the merits; instead it is 
being introduced to prove that the plaintiff will be able to succeed at a future trial. 
In Michael Pardo’s words, the immediate goal is not “material accuracy,” or 
determining “what actually happened,” but rather “procedural accuracy,” or aligning 
the outcome with what would happen at trial.248 In this way, the evidence introduced 
on a preliminary injunction hearing is “meta-evidence,” or evidence of what 
evidence will be presented at trial. This is somewhat distinct from the idea of a trial 
“preview,”249 in that meta-evidence does not necessarily reveal what will happen at 
trial, but rather it provides probative evidence of what will happen at trial. That 
evidence may be weaker or stronger, and it may point to a single possibility or 
multiple possibilities. Evidence that goes to prove the harm factors, by contrast, is 
not meta-evidence: when it issues a decision on a preliminary injunction motion, the 
court makes an actual determination of likelihood of harm; it does not determine 
 
243. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 533 (discussing historical practice at Chancery). 
244. Id. at 541 (setting out the proper standard); see also id. at 555 (“Although the court cannot 
know at the preliminary hearing what evidence the parties will present at trial, it can estimate the 
probability of different findings of fact by using affidavits, representations of counsel, inferences from 
the failure to produce accessible evidence, and the judge’s own notions about the plausibility of the 
parties’ contentions.”).  
245. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 120 (1991). 
Laycock distinguishes this from “the probability that plaintiff will prevail on some issue of ultimate 
liability.” Id. But the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail is inherently a part of the likelihood that he will 
obtain the same relief permanently. 
246. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1961, 2015 (2007) (suggesting trial judges get involved in settlement discussions so as to 
communicate tentative merits evaluations); Miller, supra note 219, at 195. 
 247. See, e.g., Smith v. Aroostook Cty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149-54 (D. Me. 2019). Courts are 
required to make findings of fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2), but I see no reason these cannot be 
framed in terms of what the parties are likely to be able to prove. 
248. See Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1470–71 (2010). 
249. See Bert I. Huang, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2013). 
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how likely it is that the plaintiff will be able to prove likelihood of harm absent a 
preliminary injunction at some later date. 
The FRE exclude certain types of evidence when used for an improper purpose. 
For example, an out-of-court statement is inadmissible hearsay only if it is offered 
“to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”250 When evaluating 
whether some piece of evidence is inadmissible hearsay, then, a judge needs to ask, 
“Is this evidence being offered for the truth of the matter asserted?” If we 
understand that evidence as being used to prove a likelihood of success, that affects 
our determination of whether it is being admitted for the truth of the matter 
asserted: if evidence that somebody said something once is admitted to prove that 
they will say it in admissible form at trial, that evidence is not being used for the 
truth of the matter. Therefore, it is not hearsay, and it is admissible under the FRE. 
For example,251 say we have a trademark dispute between one pharmaceutical 
company that makes a drug called Flexxor and another that makes a drug called 
Lexxor. To prove likelihood of success on the merits—to show Flexxor will be able 
to prove people confuse the drugs—a manager at the Flexxor company submits an 
affidavit saying that five of his salespeople have told him that doctors have called 
them to ask how much Lexxor costs. Are these statements within the affidavit 
hearsay? I submit that they are not: The affidavit is not being introduced to show 
that doctors have in fact called Flexxor salespeople asking for the price of Lexxor.252 
Instead, it is being introduced to prove that there are five salespeople in the 
plaintiff’s employ who could come to court and testify that they received these calls. 
At that point, they would be cross-examined, and the factfinder could choose 
whether to credit their testimony. This is not as powerful meta-evidence as a 
transcript from a previous proceeding or live testimony would be. A transcript 
would be strong proof that the declarant is willing and able to testify in court. And 
if the salespeople testified live, the judge would be much more certain that they 
would testify to the confusion at trial, and she could perform a preliminary 
credibility determination. But the affidavit is still probative of what would happen 
at trial. 
This does not mean that no statements offered to show likelihood of success 
are hearsay. Say that instead of the affidavit above, the manager submitted an 
affidavit saying, “My friend, the late, great Dr. Cautious,253 told me that on multiple 
occasions, he started to write a prescription for Lexxor, and halfway through 
realized he actually meant to prescribe Flexxor.” Dr. Cautious is deceased and 
therefore unable to testify. This affidavit, then, is not admissible meta-evidence. It 
is still probative of Flexxor’s ability to prove its case at trial. However, it is probative 
only if Dr. Cautious’s statement is offered for the truth. The chain of inference is 
 
250. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
251. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Kos Pharmaceuticals. 
252. The doctors’ question—“How much does Lexxor cost?”—is also not hearsay, as it is not 
an assertion, express or implied. 
253. Ironically, Dr. Cautious died B.A.S.E. jumping. 
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(1) Dr. Cautious said he mixed up the drugs on multiple occasions; (2) therefore, he 
did in fact mix up the drugs; (3) therefore, the drugs are easily confused; and  
(4) therefore, there are likely other doctors who will testify to mixing up the drugs. 
In this case, because the court needs to accept the truth of the out-of-court 
statement to find it relevant to the ultimate issue—what evidence will be presented 
at trial—it is hearsay and inadmissible. 
If the court were faced with true hearsay that is absolutely necessary to do 
justice, the court would still have discretion to accept it under Rule 807, the residual 
exception to the rule against hearsay. One of the requirements of Rule 807 is that 
the evidence be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”254 “Reasonable 
efforts” here could be interpreted as efforts reasonable in the preliminary injunction 
context, given time and resource constraints. The hearsay catchall may, then, have 
wider arms at preliminary injunction hearings than it does at trial. 
This reasoning, showing that statements within affidavits are often  
non-hearsay and therefore admissible, does require courts to accept affidavits 
themselves as non-hearsay for purposes of a preliminary injunction motion. James 
Duane has previously made a point very similar to my meta-evidence idea in an 
argument that affidavits considered on a motion for summary judgment are not 
hearsay.255 He argues that these affidavits are not introduced for the truth of the 
statements within them but rather as evidence that the affiant will testify to those 
statements at trial.256 Therefore, Rule 56 is not an exception to the rule against 
hearsay—affidavits introduced in that context are simply non-hearsay.257 At the 
preliminary injunction stage, I rely on Rule 43(c)—and the longstanding practice of 
accepting affidavits—for the proposition that affidavits are admissible, at the 
judge’s discretion, on a preliminary injunction motion. The advisory committee 
notes to FRE 802, the rule against hearsay, specifically identify affidavits admitted 
under Rule 43 as an exception to the rule. I therefore take affidavits made on 
personal knowledge to be the equivalent of in-court testimony. Statements within 
affidavits, however, may still be inadmissible hearsay.258 
 
254. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2). 
255. See Duane, supra note 26, at 1531–44 (arguing that affidavits submitted in support of or in 
opposition to a Rule 56 motion are non-hearsay). 
256. See id. 
257. The advisory committee notes to FRE 802 indicate that Rule 56 is an exception. I agree 
with Duane, but I note that evidence supporting a preliminary injunction motion is even more clearly 
meta-evidence than evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment: In its order on a preliminary 
injunction motion, a court actually makes findings as to the likelihood of success on the merits. On a 
motion for summary judgment, the court does not make findings, but rather draws all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, for purposes of resolving the motion. 
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007). Evidence, then, plays a slightly 
different role in the summary judgment context than it does at trial, whereas  
meta-evidence on a preliminary injunction motion operates as evidence normally does: it may be more 
or less probative on a point of fact. 
258. In the summary judgment context, Duane calls the idea that a court may consider hearsay 
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Understanding likelihood-of-success evidence as meta-evidence has the 
greatest impact on hearsay analysis. But it may also help illuminate how a court 
could hear expert evidence that would not be allowed at trial. Rule 702, and therefore 
Daubert, applies whenever an expert testifies to his or her opinion, independent of 
what that opinion is used for.259 However, this does not necessarily mean that every 
case requiring an expert will require the expert to produce final conclusions that meet 
the Daubert standard at the preliminary injunction. An expert can testify to 
intermediate conclusions or the methodology that they would use, if they were to 
testify at trial. For example, researchers often run pilot studies to determine if a full 
study with the same methodology is feasible and whether the study is worth 
pursuing.260 If a researcher would need to run a complete study to present as an 
expert witness at trial, and if the pilot study is considered a reliable method of 
forming an opinion that a full study is feasible, a researcher could introduce the pilot 
study at the preliminary injunction stage as meta-evidence.261 As long as this 
testimony itself is reliable, it would satisfy Daubert and be sufficiently probative for 
use at the preliminary injunction hearing. 
The categorical exclusion Rules—Rules 404 through 411—would generally 
apply with full force at the preliminary injunction stage. For example, evidence of a 
person’s character trait is inadmissible to prove that the person acted in accordance 
with that character in a particular instance.262 Say we have a copyright case, where 
 
in the form of affidavits but not hearsay within affidavits “senseless.” Duane, supra note 26, at 1529. He 
argues that the difference in reliability between hearsay and “multiple hearsay” is, at best, a difference 
“only in degree of reliability, not in kind,” and multiple hearsay may well be more reliable than simple 
hearsay. Id. at 1529–30. It is true, of course, that affidavits are not subject to cross-examination and are 
therefore less reliable than in-court testimony. However, they are made under penalty of perjury—one 
safeguard of live testimony against insincerity—and they are written down, lowering the chances of a 
remark being misleading simply because it is ill-phrased. Hearsay within the affidavit still has these 
attendant dangers. 
 In addition, Duane argues, the FRE do not otherwise differentiate between hearsay and multiple 
hearsay. Id. at 1530. There, I disagree: the advisory committee notes on Rule 802 list multiple exceptions 
to the rule against hearsay from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 43 motions based on material 
outside the record, yes, but also affidavits used to secure a temporary restraining order and depositions 
used at trial. FED R. EVID. 802; FED R. CIV. P. 43. The Rules contemplate that affidavits and 
depositions, admitted for the truth of their contents, are sufficiently reliable for some circumstances. I 
disagree with Duane, then, that this distinction is incoherent. However, I agree with him that for 
purposes of a motion for summary judgment, an affidavit that satisfies the Rule 56 requirements is not, 
in fact, hearsay. 
259. FED. R. EVID. 702 (referring to when a “witness who is qualified as an expert . . .  
may testify”). 
260. See Edwin R. van Teijlingen & Vanora Hundley, The Importance of Pilot Studies, SOC. RES. 
UPDATE, Winter 2001, at 2 tbl.1, 4 (2001), http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU35.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A4LK-7VRD] (“Well-designed and well-conducted pilot studies can inform us about the best research 
process and occasionally about likely outcomes.”). 
261. Cf. Hon. Daniel P. Ryan, The Use of Gilles De La Tourette’s Syndrome as an Impulse Control 
Defense in Criminal Cases: A Comprehensive Review, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 375, 424 (2010) 
(“[A] pilot study may be performed with scientifically reliable methods but because it is a pilot study a 
judge may not consider it ‘reliable’ from an evidentiary perspective.”). 
262. See FED. R. EVID. 404. 
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the plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied original elements of the plaintiff’s 
work.263 On a preliminary injunction motion, the plaintiff wants to introduce 
evidence that the defendant has copied works in the past to show a propensity for 
copying.264 How would this show likelihood of success on the merits? This evidence 
itself would not be admissible at trial, under the character evidence prohibition. It 
could also show likelihood of success on the merits through the following chain of 
inference: (1) the defendant has a propensity for copying; (2) therefore, he copied 
on this occasion; (3) therefore, the plaintiff is likely to unearth evidence of copying 
during discovery; and (4) therefore, the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. 
However, this chain of reasoning also invokes the forbidden character inference: the 
defendant has a propensity for copying so he copied on this occasion. This use of 
character evidence is forbidden, and the court should not consider the evidence. 
For similar reasons, the other categorical-exclusion rules—those excluding 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures,265 settlement offers,266 and offers to pay 
medical expenses,267 among others—would apply to exclude likelihood-of-success 
evidence. But these sorts of rules—rules that primarily serve the purpose of creating 
an incentive for certain out-of-court behavior268—should apply at the preliminary 
injunction stage. If admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures, settlement 
offers,269 or offers to pay medical expenses at trial disincentivizes those behaviors, 
admitting the evidence during preliminary injunction hearings should have the same 
effect. These rules would operate to exclude evidence, even meta-evidence, 
introduced to prove likelihood of success on the merits. 
Some courts have come close to articulating the meta-evidence idea. For 
example, in Bebe Stores, Inc. v. May Department Stores International, Inc., the district 
court addressed a hearsay objection to affidavits by noting that the affidavits could 
 
263. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
264. Cf. Loggerhead Tools, L.L.C. v. Sears Holdings Corp., No. 12 C 9033, 2017 WL 4161976, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2017). 
265. See FED. R. EVID. 407. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures used to prove a defect 
is unlikely to arise in a preliminary injunction proceeding. If the product has already been remedied, 
there is no urgent need for an injunction. 
266. See FED. R. EVID. 408. 
267. See FED. R. EVID. 409. 
268. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. For a criticism of this 
rationale, see Dan M. Kahan, The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Political—of “Subsequent 
Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (2010). 
269. The logic is more complicated than for the other exclusionary rules. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408 forbids using statements made during settlement negotiations to prove the “validity” of 
a disputed “claim.” A statement made during settlement negotiations could be introduced to prove that 
the person would make the same statement if called to the stand, which seems not to violate Rule 408. 
However, first, even if this were permissible, the evidence would be weak; during settlement 
negotiations, parties choose their words strategically, and may well speak differently on the stand. 
Second, and more importantly, the broad language of Rule 408 should be interpreted to further its aims. 
See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 4:57. Proving the need for a preliminary injunction 
or proving likelihood of success could both be construed as proving the “validity” of the “claim.” This 
evidence should be excluded. 
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come in under Rule 807, and having “sworn statements of thirty-five more 
[witnesses]—who certainly can all be called live or by deposition when we ultimately 
have trial on the merits—is probative on the issue of whether bebe is likely to 
succeed on the issue of confusion.”270 Others have suggested that the hearsay status 
of evidence presented at a preliminary injunction hearing renders it inadmissible or 
goes to its weight not because the evidence is less reliable but rather because it will 
not be admissible at trial.271 And courts have correctly suggested that the likelihood 
of success should also be tied to the completeness of the evidence: if discovery is 
complete before the hearing, the likelihood of success is directly related to the 
admissible evidence the plaintiff can present at that hearing.272 If the hearing 
happens without much opportunity for discovery, much weaker evidence may show 
a likelihood of success. But courts have not taken the idea to its logical conclusion 
concerning hearsay and other rules, discussed above. And I have found no court 
suggesting that the admissibility standard might look different for the different 
elements of the preliminary injunction test. 
ii. Meta-Evidence Generally 
The meta-evidence concept is useful beyond the preliminary injunction 
stage—at several points in a litigation, parties may be required to present some sort 
of proof of what they will be able to demonstrate at trial. And at each of these 
points, rules govern the meta-evidence that each party may present and the burden 
each party faces. Meta-evidence provides a helpful new way of conceptualizing what 
happens at each juncture. For purposes of this theoretical discussion, I use 
“evidence” in a broad sense: I include not only proof admitted as evidence but rather 
all factual material the parties present to a decisionmaker. 
One obvious point at which meta-evidence is introduced is on a motion for 
summary judgment. The parties have typically engaged in extensive discovery at this 
point, and they present a preview of what evidence will be available at trial.273 
Therefore, the parties are held to a high meta-evidentiary standard and  
burden—they must submit reliable, highly-probative proof of what evidence will be 
presented at trial. Compliance with the Rule 56(c)(4) requirements provides strong 
evidence that an affiant will, in fact, testify to the facts set out in the affidavit274: a 
person who was willing to swear to facts in an affidavit is likely to swear to the same 
 
270. 230 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 2002), aff’d in part, 313 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2002). 
271. See, e.g., Gluco Perfect, L.L.C. v. Perfect Gluco Prods., Inc., No. 14-CV-1678, 2014 WL 
4966102, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014) (“Moreover, this court has considered whether the exclusion at 
trial of inadmissible hearsay evidence will affect plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits.”); Lawson 
v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. CIV.A. 02-1223, 2002 WL 1837870, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2002). 
272. See Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Where discovery 
is complete as to actions occurring before April 3, 2009, plaintiff’s likelihood of success is closely tied 
to the admissible evidence he can present at trial.”). 
273. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Duane, supra note 26. 
274. See Duane, supra note 26, at 1541–42. 
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facts on the witness stand.275 All other evidence cited on a motion for summary 
judgment must be presentable in admissible form;276 that evidence, too, is highly 
probative of what will be presented at trial. Courts have generally held, therefore, 
that hearsay within an affidavit cannot be considered on a motion for summary 
judgment.277 As James Duane has pointed out, this means that no hearsay is 
admissible on a motion for summary judgment: the affidavits—out-of-court 
statements—are not being offered for their truth, but rather to demonstrate that the 
affiant will testify to the facts stated in the affidavit.278 
Meta-evidence considered on a motion for summary judgment is dispositive as 
to the meta-evidence issue: What evidence will be presented at trial? In other words, 
the court takes the evidence submitted on the motion for summary judgment and 
asks itself, “If I assume that all of these witnesses . . . would testify at trial just as 
they have in their affidavits, is there any way this case could survive a motion for 
[judgment as a matter of law]?”279 For purposes of a summary judgment motion, 
then, meta-evidence that satisfies Rule 56’s strict standards is not merely probative 
of what evidence will be presented at trial—it’s conclusive. 
The meta-evidence idea also presents a new way of understanding motions to 
dismiss and a potential approach to evaluating the standard on a motion to dismiss. 
A party’s allegations in a complaint are, in a sense, meta-evidence. By signing a 
pleading, a party’s attorney certifies that “after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances,” to the best of their “knowledge, information, and belief,” “the 
factual contentions [in the pleading] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery.”280 This certification makes it more likely that 
there will, in fact, be evidentiary support for the factual proposition. Rule 11 does 
not explicitly require that the attorney believe that there will be admissible evidentiary 
support for the fact, although at least one commentator has noted that “the use of 
the words ‘evidence’ and ‘evidentiary support’ impart the notion of admissibility.”281 
 
275. This is not conclusive evidence, of course. “[T]he affiant need not state a willingness to 
submit to cross-examination at trial and thereby waive the ability to claim a privilege and refuse to give 
testimony.” 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2738. 
276. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
277. See, e.g., Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322–24 (11th Cir. 1999); Garside v. Osco 
Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 970–71 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 1984); 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29,  
§ 2738 n.15 (collecting cases). But see Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2012); 
Ali v. Dist. Dir., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2016). These courts, which allow hearsay if the 
declarant could testify, essentially operate under a different meta-evidentiary regime. 
278. See Duane, supra note 26, at 1535. 
279. Id. at 1580. 
280. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
281. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 1(A)(4), 
at 28 (5th ed. 2013). Some courts have suggested as much. See Jackson v. Cronic, No. 2:11-CV-00058-
WCO, 2013 WL 12099477, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2013) (“As the record suggests that there was no 
admissible evidence to support either of these claims, the court must necessarily conclude that plaintiff’s 
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On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s meta-evidentiary burden is low. The 
court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 
complaint.”282 Another way of understanding this standard is that for purposes of 
a motion to dismiss, the lawyer’s certification is dispositive meta-evidence: if a 
lawyer certifies that after a reasonable inquiry, she has determined that there is or 
will be evidence to support the well-pleaded factual contention, the court must 
conclude from that evidence that the party will present evidence on that point. (The 
court must also conclude that the factfinder will credit the evidence and find the 
fact in the plaintiff’s favor.) At this stage—before any discovery, while the plaintiff 
is asking for no more than that the case move forward—the party need not present 
evidence beyond the lawyer’s certification. 
Twombly283 and Iqbal284 can be understood as imposing a heightened  
meta-evidentiary standard relative to what came before. Under those cases, a court 
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss first disregards any conclusory 
allegations and then determines whether the well-pleaded allegations state a 
plausible claim to relief.285 In other words, Twombly and Iqbal impose a rule of 
weight, a rule that “guides the factfinder’s evaluation of the evidence by specifying 
the probative value the factfinder ought to attach to a given piece of evidence.”286 
If an allegation is non-conclusory, it has infinite meta-evidentiary probative value. 
If it is conclusory, it has no probative value. The implication of this aspect of 
Twombly and Iqbal is that when a lawyer certifies that they have or will likely have 
evidence to support a more concrete and specific statement,287 that is sufficiently 
probative for purposes of a motion to dismiss. When a lawyer certifies that they 
have or will likely have evidence to support a legal conclusion, that is insufficiently 
probative to be credited for purposes of that motion. 
Although the purpose of the motion to dismiss is contested,288 one commonly 
cited function, which the Supreme Court invoked in Twombly, is to filter out 
unmeritorious cases and allow the cases that are more likely to ultimately succeed 
to proceed to discovery.289 Reading Twombly and Iqbal (“Twiqbal”) through a meta-
 
counsel failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine whether they had a legitimate basis in fact 
before he advocated them before the court.”). 
282. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002). 
283. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
284. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
285. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81. 
286. See Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2008). 
287. Adam Steinman suggests that non-conclusory allegations are those that identify “the  
real-world acts or events underlying the plaintiff’s claim.” Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1334 (2010). 
288. Compare Daniel A. Epstein, How Probable Is “Plausible”?, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 
39–45 (2018) (proposing a model of the motion to dismiss that minimizes error costs), with Christopher 
M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 556 (2002) (arguing, pre-Twombly and Iqbal, 
that “under the Federal Rules pleadings serve but a single function: providing notice”). 
289. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 (2007); Steinman, supra note 287, at 
1347 (characterizing the purposes of pleading as “notice-giving, process-facilitating, and  
merits-screening”). 
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evidentiary lens suggests one way to partially reduce the effectiveness of its first step 
to an empirical question: How probative is a conclusory statement at the pleading 
stage, before the plaintiff has had the opportunity for discovery? When a lawyer 
certifies that there is or is likely to be evidentiary support for a conclusory allegation, 
how strongly does that, in fact, indicate that there will be evidentiary support for 
the proposition at trial? If it is very weak—if plaintiffs who make conclusory 
allegations only overwhelmingly come up empty-handed after discovery—perhaps 
Twombly and Iqbal have it right. But if plaintiffs who make conclusory allegations do 
tend to come up with admissible evidence during discovery—this seems particularly 
likely in areas where defendants hold key evidence290—these cases may impose too 
high a meta-evidentiary burden. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that judges should inquire into the likelihood 
that a specific plaintiff will be able to produce evidence when ruling on a motion to 
dismiss. Rather, I suggest that the meta-evidence concept lets us evaluate whether 
Twiqbal draws a distinction that is likely to aid in separating meritorious cases from 
unmeritorious cases at the motion to dismiss stage. An empirical study of this issue 
may not be possible—Alex Reinert likely got as close as possible by studying  
pre-Twiqbal cases, concluding that “thinly” pleaded cases were no less likely to result 
in a plaintiff-favorable outcome than cases generally.291 But meta-evidence presents 
one new way of conceptualizing the Twiqbal standard. 
Third, and perhaps least interestingly, offers of proof are meta-evidence. 
When a court sustains an evidentiary objection, the proponent of the evidence may 
make an offer of proof, or “proffer.”292 The offer of proof informs the court of the 
substance of the proposed evidence and the lawyer’s theory of admissibility.293 This 
allows the court to reconsider its ruling and, more importantly, preserves the 
objection for appellate review.294 
Offers of proof are functionally dispositive meta-evidence for both the trial 
court and the court of appeals: the judge determines admissibility based on the 
substance of the evidence offered. However, a lawyer may make an offer of proof 
in one of two basic ways, and these methods differ in their meta-evidentiary value. 
Either counsel may summarize the evidence, orally or in writing, or counsel may 
 
290. Cf. Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and 
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008) (concluding that “pleading 
standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal standards and the social 
costs of litigation”). 
291. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); 
see also Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 
374 n.8, 376 (2016) (concluding “empirics cannot conclusively resolve the case-quality aspects of 
the Twiqbal debate” and criticizing Reinert’s study for coding settlements as plaintiff-favorable 
outcomes). 
292. See Lewis Kapner, Offers of Proof, 21 FAM. L.Q. 265, 268 (1987). 
293. See 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 103.20 (2d ed. 1997). 
294. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). 
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produce actual witness testimony, live or by deposition.295 While the witness’s live 
testimony out of the presence of the jury is very strong evidence of what the witness 
would say, counsel may be mistaken, optimistic, or imprecise in their summary.296 
Implicitly recognizing these concerns, Federal Rule 103(c) allows the court to direct 
that the offer of proof be made in “question-and-answer form.”297 In this way, the 
Federal Rules themselves provide a mechanism to achieve sufficiently reliable  
meta-evidence—evidence of what evidence would be offered at trial—for both the 
trial court and the reviewing court of appeals. 
Meta-evidence may arise elsewhere in the law,298 but these three examples 
suffice to show that the concept is not limited to the preliminary injunction context. 
c. Other Elements of the Preliminary Injunction Standard 
While the question for the first prong of the preliminary injunction test is 
“what is the plaintiff likely to prove at trial?” the other prongs of the Winter test299 
concern facts outside of the court context. What is the likely irreparable harm of 
denying or granting a preliminary injunction? In what direction does the balance of 
hardships lean? Is it in the public interest to grant or deny the preliminary 
injunction? For these prongs, the Rules of Evidence would apply conventionally 
(again, with the exception of affidavits). The “meta-evidence” idea is irrelevant.300 
Wouldn’t this be too hard on plaintiffs, especially? Wouldn’t they have trouble 
proving irreparable harm under such a short time frame, using only evidence 
admissible under the FRE and affidavits? 
As I discuss in the next Part, this concern is real. Plaintiffs may not have ready 
access to admissible evidence showing irreparable harm. But again, applying the 
 
295. See 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 293; Jason S. Lambert, The Perfect Proffer, 89  
FLA. B.J. 38, 38–39 (2015). 
296. See Kapner, supra note 292, at 269–70. Counsel might also be dishonest. See Comment, The 
Offer of Proof in Grounding Exceptions, 31 YALE L.J. 542, 543 (1922). 
297. FED. R. EVID. 103(c). 
298. For example, meta-evidence can arise in discovery. In Zubulake v. U.B.S. Warburg, 216 
F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), the defendants resisted producing emails stored on backup tapes—an 
expensive process—and they argued that if they were required to produce the emails, the plaintiff 
should pay for production. To determine whether the tapes were likely to contain relevant evidence not 
available elsewhere, Judge Scheindlin directed the production of a sample of emails, and she used that 
evidence as a sort of meta-evidence to analyze what evidence the other tapes might contain. See id. at 
281–87. I thank John Leubsdorf for this example. And a sort of counterfactual meta-evidence may arise 
in legal malpractice suits, where the plaintiff must show that he would have prevailed or achieved a 
better result if not for his attorney’s deficient performance. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE § 33:29 (2020 ed. 2020). I thank Keith Sharfman for this example. 
299. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
300. This is true for the irreparable harm prong but not the irreparable harm inquiry. Likelihood 
of success on the merits includes the likelihood that the plaintiff will be granted a permanent injunction, 
which requires a showing of irreparable harm absent the injunction. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The plaintiff must submit meta-evidence showing that it will be able 
to prove irreparable harm at a trial on the merits. But they will also have to submit evidence—not  
meta-evidence—showing they will in fact be harmed if the preliminary injunction does not enter. I 
therefore address irreparable harm outside the meta-evidence paradigm. 
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FRE would not be as hard on movants as it sounds. Whereas plaintiffs likely do not 
have access to all the evidence they need to prove probable success on the merits, 
they’re more likely to have access to evidence that will show they themselves will be 
harmed by denial of injunctive relief. And defendants, similarly, are more likely to 
have evidence showing they will be harmed if injunctive relief is granted. It makes 
sense to hold parties to a stricter evidentiary standard with regard to evidence that 
is in their possession.301 Applying the FRE to the irreparable harm prong should 
not exclude very much key affirmative evidence. 
But what about Gavin Grimm—the transgender boy? Would he be unable to 
show irreparable harm at the preliminary injunction stage under the FRE? No. 
Grimm’s lawyers—likely recognizing that the plaintiff’s sworn statement 
concerning his own diagnosis would be insufficient—retained a psychologist for 
purposes of the lawsuit who filed her own declaration. That analyst opined, based 
on her “clinical assessment” of G.G. and her expertise, that the school’s bathroom 
policy “is currently . . . placing G.G. at risk for accruing lifelong psychological 
harm.”302 The court’s decision not to credit her statements seems to be at least as 
substantial a factor in Grimm’s loss at the district court as the court’s decision not 
to consider hearsay. Applying the FRE should make little difference in this case: 
while the judge here denied the preliminary injunction motion after excluding the 
hearsay in Grimm’s affidavit, many other judges would consider the psychologist’s 
declaration sufficiently probative of irreparable harm to Grimm.303 
Would the new regime have excluded key evidence in Mullins v. City of New 
York, the Second Circuit case that held courts may consider hearsay on preliminary 
injunction motions? In that labor suit brought by police officers, the district court 
enjoined the City of New York and the NYPD from investigating and disciplining 
police officer plaintiffs based upon their participation in the lawsuit.304 The 
plaintiffs argued that a preliminary injunction was necessary because plaintiffs who 
were not protected would drop out of the lawsuit due to fear of retaliation. The 
 
301. Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 433  
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Once plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence of irreparable harm, however, 
defendants were obliged to produce evidence other than affidavits respecting the economic effects of 
an injunction, particularly since such information is exclusively within their possession.”); Dale  
A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988) (“[M]y thesis is that there exists, 
even today, a principle of evidence law that a party should present to the tribunal the best evidence 
reasonably available on a litigated factual issue.”). 
302. Expert Declaration of Randi Ettner, Ph.D at 2, 8, 9, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester  
Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 4:15-cv-00054). 
303. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Precynthe, No. 4:16-cv-01357, 2018 WL 806764, at *6, *9–10  
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2018) (relying, in part, on Dr. Ettner’s clinical evaluation to grant a preliminary 
injunction); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (relying on a 
declaration by Dr. Ettner written after one clinical evaluation); cf. Oakleaf v. Martinez, 297 F. Supp. 3d 
1221, 1230 (D.N.M. 2018) (concluding, in part based on Dr. Ettner’s affidavit after two evaluations, 
that plaintiff had a “sufficiently serious medical need,” but ultimately denying a preliminary injunction). 
304. Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Mullins v. City of New 
York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). This preliminary injunction differs from the usual sort 
in that it enjoined pretrial activities, as opposed to preliminarily ordering the relief plaintiff sought. 
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evidence included in-court statements and affidavits averring that other plaintiffs 
had voiced concern about participating in the case absent an injunction. While the 
district court judge’s finding of irreparable harm relied on testimony that named the 
out-of-court declarants,305 the Second Circuit also noted an affidavit from one 
officer stating that approximately five sergeants—unnamed—said they were 
considering dropping out of the lawsuit for fear of reprisal.306 As the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys307 argued to the district court, this evidence was likely admissible under 
Rule 803(3), the hearsay exception for statements of “the declarant’s then-existing 
state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional . . . condition . . . .”308 
These statements concerned the declarants’ fear309 and intent to withdraw from the 
suit, so they likely fall under the exception. However, even if the court ruled that 
the exception did not apply, each named officer could sign a short affidavit, which 
would suffice for the preliminary injunction proceedings. As for officers who 
remained unnamed in the declarations, if they were not willing to come forward, 
their voices would go unheard. In one sense, this is a just result: granting an 
injunction based on anonymous, unsworn, out-of-court statements is potentially 
more troubling than excluding those statements. However, in unusual 
circumstances similar to Mullins—where the preliminary injunction would protect 
witnesses from retaliation—a court might need to take steps to protect anonymity, 
pending resolution of the motion. 
In a number of cases, then, applying the FRE would not unjustly exclude 
evidence relevant to the “harm” factors. I discuss the cases where application of the 
FRE would pose a problem in the next Part. 
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF APPLYING THE RULES 
I have critiqued the policy rationales for declining to apply the Rules of 
Evidence at the preliminary injunction stage, saying they offer insufficient 
justification. But what are the arguments for applying the FRE? And are there good 
reasons not to apply them? In this Part, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of 
applying the FRE at the preliminary stage. 
A. Reasons for Preferring Rules, Generally 
There are several reasons for preferring a system of rules—either the FRE, 
specifically, or others—as opposed to a purely discretionary system. 
First, rules increase predictability. To the extent courts maintain a wholly 
 
305. Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 383 & n.70. 
306. Mullins, 626 F.3d at 51; see Declaration of Edward Scott at 6, Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373 
(No. 1:04-cv-02979), ECF No. 169. 
307.  Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys at Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, my 
former employer. The case settled before I arrived at the firm, and I did not work on it. 
308. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
309. Plaintiffs’ Bench Memorandum Concerning the City’s Hearsay Objection to Testimony to 
Be Elicited at the Hearing at 2–3, Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373 (No. 1:04-cv-02979), ECF No. 165. 
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discretionary regime with regard to which evidence they will credit and which they 
will not, attorneys will be unable to predict reliably what evidence the court will 
consider and what evidence the court will—perhaps sub silentio—disregard entirely. 
While attorneys may try to produce the best possible evidence at the preliminary 
injunction stage,310 if they are under time pressure, rules tell the attorneys which 
evidence to prioritize in the days or weeks before the preliminary injunction hearing. 
If they know what evidence the judge will consider, they know what to look for. 
Imposition of rules would also tell parties how to argue their evidentiary objections. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests many attorneys believe the FRE apply at the 
preliminary injunction stage,311 despite court statements to the contrary, and those 
attorneys may waste time on misguided arguments. Applying the FRE would bring 
the law in line with their expectations. Rules tell the parties what evidence to search 
for and how to argue for its exclusion. 
Additionally, rules of evidence require judges to justify their decisions under 
those rules. Forcing judges to give reasons for their decisions has at least two 
benefits. First, it helps judges make better-thought-out evidentiary decisions. Giving 
reasons for evidentiary decisions may serve as a check on those decisions, 
particularly in a domain where error correction by an appellate court is unlikely.312 
In the current regime, a court can note that the rules do not apply and state, “The 
Court, therefore, in its discretion will consider all evidentiary submissions at this 
stage, giving these submissions appropriate weight, without regard to whether these 
evidentiary submissions” satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 or the FRE.313 In a 
system with rules, the court might need to articulate why each challenged piece of 
evidence satisfied the rules—it would be forced to think about whether and why 
each piece of evidence merited consideration. 
 
310. Tenth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview, supra note 117. 
311. Id. 
312. See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683, 
701–02 (2014); cf. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 611 (“[R]equiring judges to evaluate class certification 
motions based on a true and reliable evidentiary record will enhance the judicial function, inducing 
judges to make deliberative decisions in the shadow of possible appellate reversal for erroneous reliance 
on inadmissible materials”). Judith Resnik has suggested that the creation of a public trial record, along 
with the threat of appellate review, may compel judges to make sufficiently  
well-supported decisions, explaining the low reversal rate. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96  
HARV. L. REV. 374, 408 n.137 (1982). 
313. McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 
2017); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Lifewatch Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 757, 762 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“[T]he 
court has assigned the appropriate weight to the evidence, including hearsay, and has considered only 
the hearsay that bears sufficient indicia of reliability.”); Startrak Systems, L.L.C. v. Hester, No. 07-3203, 
2007 WL 2705159, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2007) (“Given the nature of this proceeding, the court will 
not strike the affidavit of Thomas Robinson. Instead, the court will exercise its discretion in 
determining the weight given to each affiant in this matter.”); S. Foods Grp. L.P. v. Ben & Jerry’s 
Homemade Inc., No. 98CV-54S, 1998 WL 718302, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 1998) (“While there are 
portions of some of the affidavits that are conclusory or otherwise inappropriate to be considered as 
evidence, the Court denies the motion to strike, and has given what it deems the appropriate weight to 
the various evidentiary submissions of the parties.”). 
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The FRE could limit judicial bias by compelling judges to exclude evidence 
that helps the party they tend to favor, or vice versa.314 Without this reason-giving, 
a judge would be able to credit even unreliable evidence given by a party she was 
predisposed to favor. With reason-giving, confabulation is of course still possible,315 
and judges could silently or subconsciously consider evidence they have rejected. 
But there is at least potential for mitigation. “The judge who is required to enforce 
the rules of evidence on herself is a judge who might in an ideal world be able to 
function simultaneously as . . . archangel and prole.”316 And limiting discretion can 
contribute to a perception of procedural fairness, which can make the work of the 
courts appear more legitimate in the public’s eye.317 
Second, reason-giving forces judges to clarify their thinking about the proper 
role of each challenged piece of evidence.318 For example, in the travel ban case, 
judges appeared to take Giuliani’s statement as direct evidence of President Trump’s 
intent to keep Muslims out of the country.319 Had the statement been challenged 
on hearsay grounds, the plaintiffs and the court would have been forced to articulate 
why the evidence was relevant—it suggests a likelihood of success on the merits 
because it presents a potential witness—which in turn would help the court 
appreciate the probative value of the evidence. If a challenged piece of evidence has 
one permissible use and one impermissible use, when a judge chooses to consider 
it, she will articulate the permissible use and recognize the evidence as probative on 
that point only. Relatedly, when a judge makes an evidentiary determination, she 
may clarify how she understands the law—when she discussed why a piece of 
evidence is probative, she can signal what the plaintiff has to prove. That 
information will allow the parties to make stronger arguments down the road. 
Finally, there is the possibility that the FRE actually do what they are designed 
to do: enhance accuracy of decision-making by excluding evidence that factfinders 
 
314. Cf. Norris, supra note 212, at 489 (recounting how judges used to refuse to hear oral 
evidence from labor unions when employers moved for preliminary injunctions). 
315. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law 
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 518–22 (2015) (arguing that because judges will use motivated 
reasoning to construct post hoc justifications for preferred results, requiring reason-giving “may yield 
insincerity and artificiality in judicial discourse, rather than promoting accountability  
and transparency”). 
316. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 
193 (2006). 
317. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 780 
(2017); Effron, supra note 312, at 704; see also Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial 
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (1985) (noting procedures promote 
the public acceptability of verdicts). But see Cohen, supra note 315, at 514–17 (arguing that detailed 
reason-giving can expose points of disagreement and cause legitimacy problems). 
318. See Effron, supra note 312, at 714–15. 
319. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558 (D. Md. 2017). 
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are likely to overvalue.320 Although the FRE have been widely321—and in some 
cases quite persuasively322—criticized, we have, as a polity, determined that they 
enhance accuracy.323 Frederick Schauer has argued, based on the general benefits 
of having legal rules, “there appears to be more justification for a rule-based 
approach to evidence than is accepted nowadays, and the idea of Free Proof may 
have more cognitive and epistemic disadvantages than” some believe.324 To the 
extent that the Rules of Evidence helpfully eliminate evidence that is likely to bias 
factfinders, application of the FRE could have some salutary effect. 
Application of the FRE may ultimately make little difference. Even though the 
FRE do apply to bench trials, courts often apply them loosely in that context.325 
This may be in part because judges think themselves more capable than jurors326 
and in part because they recognize that they can’t “unhear” evidence whose 
admissibility they’ve considered. And as Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski have 
demonstrated, judges are sometimes unable to disregard inadmissible evidence.327 
Further, appellate courts would be unlikely to reverse many decisions based on 
evidentiary determinations. 
However, requiring application of the FRE would discourage parties from 
even attempting to introduce clearly inadmissible evidence, affording some 
protection. Also, application of the FRE might put a thumb on the scale when 
judges weigh evidence: even if they can’t unhear hearsay, by formally saying they 
will not consider it, it may factor less into their decision.328 Unlike juries, who 
typically issue general verdicts,329 judges issuing preliminary injunctions must state 
their findings of fact.330 If the court has excluded the only piece of evidence 
supporting a necessary finding, it will have a difficult time making that finding. And 
certainly, making a Daubert determination could alter a judge’s perspective on that 
 
320. See Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 
967–68 (2003) (noting that for hearsay, character, and expert evidence, “a large part of the reason usually 
given for exclusion of evidence . . . is fear that the jury will overvalue the evidence”). 
321. See Friedman, supra note 320. Cf. BENTHAM, supra note 236 (advocating free proof). 
322. See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing criticisms of 
the present-sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the rule against hearsay). 
323. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 133 (2005) (“To be legitimate, 
[adjudicators’] risk-allocating decisions ought to be justified by moral and political principles classifying 
as authoritative. These principles ought to reflect societal preferences in the area of risk-allocation. 
These general preferences need to be both adopted and adapted by the law of evidence.”). 
324. Schauer, supra note 316, at 193–94. 
325. Id. at 165–66, 195. 
326. See James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247 (2018). 
327. See generally Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
328. In at least a couple of their studies, Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski found a sizeable 
but—due to the size of the sample—statistically insignificant difference in outcome between judges 
who admitted the evidence at issue and judges who excluded the evidence. See id. at 1296, 1302. It is 
not clear whether this difference would attain significance with a larger sample. See id. 
329. See 9B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2501; Donald Olander, Note, Resolving 
Inconsistencies in Federal Special Verdicts, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1985). 
330. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(2). 
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evidence: if a court takes the time to determine whether expert evidence is 
scientifically reliable and decides that it is not, the court will probably give less 
weight to that evidence than it otherwise would have. Studies have found that 
people are better able to ignore evidence when “the credibility of the inadmissible 
information sought to be ignored is destroyed or at least called into question.”331 
The arguments for imposing rules—particularly the FRE—are admittedly 
weaker here than in other contexts where scholars have advocated their application 
outside trial. For example, in her argument for applying evidentiary rules to class 
certification proceedings, Linda Mullenix observes that those proceedings have 
become bloated with large quantities of inadmissible evidence, and she worries that 
judges might be influenced by volume rather than quality.332 In preliminary 
injunction proceedings, time constraints may limit the amount of evidence parties 
can gather in time for a hearing. None of the judges I spoke with suggested they 
were overwhelmed with evidence at preliminary injunction hearings. 
B. Problems with Applying the Rules 
The previous sections have critiqued the justifications for doing away with the 
FRE at preliminary injunction proceedings and have discussed how applying those 
Rules could be beneficial. But there are potentially serious problems with applying 
the FRE at the preliminary injunction stage. Specifically, the FRE may lead to less 
accurate findings in preliminary injunction proceedings than they do after discovery. 
Also, this inaccuracy may disproportionately fall on plaintiffs, improperly 
reallocating the risk of error. 
As discussed above, courts have justified ditching the FRE by citing the need 
to prevent irreparable harm quickly.333 How does that need justify abandonment of 
the FRE? If litigants cannot discover all relevant evidence in the time before the 
preliminary injunction hearing, applying the FRE may operate to exclude the 
evidence that they do have, and it may deny the court a factual basis for imposing 
(or declining to impose) a preliminary injunction. This increases the likelihood that 
the court will fail to prevent (or cause) irreparable harm. In John Leubsdorf’s words, 
it increases “the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to  
hasty decision.”334 
But excluding evidence at trial also may deprive the court of the only evidence 
the litigants have. Why is doing so more likely to cause the court to err at a 
preliminary injunction hearing? Because time constraints mean even parties with 
valid claims may be able to collect only “fragmentary information” before a 
preliminary injunction hearing,335 the inability to produce high-quality, admissible 
 
331. Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 327, at 1275–76. 
332. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 624–25. I am skeptical that judges will succumb to this error. 
333. See supra text accompanying notes 228–33. 
334. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541. 
335. Berman, supra note 214, at 34. 
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evidence is less characteristic of a weak case at the preliminary injunction stage than 
it is at trial. Parties with strong cases are likely to be able to obtain high-quality, 
admissible evidence during discovery. Therefore, by excluding low-quality evidence 
at trial, the FRE should rarely seriously prejudice strong cases; instead, they force 
parties to produce the “best evidence reasonably available.”336 At the preliminary 
injunction stage, however, many meritorious plaintiffs may not have admissible 
evidence. This means that the alternative to inadmissible evidence will not be “better 
evidence”; it will be “no evidence.” By excluding low-quality evidence at the 
preliminary injunction stage, then, the court prejudices more strong cases than it 
does by excluding low-quality evidence at trial. It inhibits accurate fact finding. 
Importantly, this distinction holds only where the plaintiffs could obtain 
admissible evidence if given the time but can obtain only inadmissible evidence due 
to time limitations. In cases where the parties are able to obtain evidence for the 
preliminary injunction hearing equivalent to what they would obtain for trial, 
accuracy considerations provide no justification for admitting additional evidence 
at the preliminary injunction stage. This is particularly likely if the harm evidence is 
within the proponent’s possession or if the preliminary injunction hearing occurs 
long after the motion is filed. The time from case initiation to the preliminary 
injunction hearing varies dramatically, from days to years.337 Anticipating this 
variation, Rule 65(a)(2) not only allows admissible evidence from the preliminary 
injunction hearing to come in at trial but even allows a judge to consolidate the 
hearing with the trial on the merits. Time constraints are not so much a hallmark of 
a preliminary injunction motion as a distinct possibility. Only when time is short 
and the evidence suffers for it is there a strong reason to abandon the FRE. 
An additional problem with applying the FRE at the preliminary injunction 
stage is that it may shift the risk of error disproportionately onto plaintiffs. 
Allocating risk of error is a primary function of rules of evidence.338 In civil 
litigation, we generally allocate the risk so as not to prefer one party over the  
 
336. Nance, supra note 301, at 227. 
337. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 203, at 595 tbl.3B (examining patent cases in the early 
1990s and finding that preliminary injunction hearings occurred a little over six months after case 
initiation, on average). Another set of authors analyzed every reported decision on a TRO or preliminary 
injunction motion in the federal courts from 2003 to 2006. See KIRSTIN STOLL-DEBELL, NANCY  
L. DEMPSEY & BRADFORD E. DEMPSEY, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 189–91 (2009). Averages ranged from about one month to nearly 
two years, with many districts averaging about six months. Id. I have not included districts that reported 
only one decision during this period. The District of Nebraska reported only one decision, which 
appears to have taken about a week, and the District of Wyoming reported only one decision, which 
took about twenty-six months. Id. at 190–91, 194. 
338. STEIN, supra note 323, at 133–40; see also Michael S. Pardo, The Political Morality of Evidence 
Law, 5 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE [i], 4 (2007) (reviewing Stein’s book and noting that part of 
the “moral” task of evidence law is to allocate the risk of error, calling this “orthodoxy in  
evidence scholarship”). 
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other: the plaintiff’s losses and defendant’s losses are equally bad.339 The burden of 
proof on each element is essentially a tie-breaking rule.340 
The imposition of exclusionary rules under time constraints could, however, 
shift this risk. Plaintiffs, who carry the burden of production and persuasion, always 
need to present evidence that they are likely to succeed and likely to suffer 
irreparable harm absent an injunction. Evidence will not come solely from the 
plaintiff’s side, of course: defendants introduce evidence both negating the 
plaintiff’s case and demonstrating that an injunction will itself cause irreparable 
harm. Still, among the cases in which a party challenges the admissibility of evidence, 
they appear to be largely challenges by defendants to plaintiff evidence—in every 
one of the major circuit cases discussed above, the challenge was to the plaintiff’s 
evidence.341 If plaintiffs are the ones offering inadmissible evidence, applying the 
FRE will shift the risk of error in preliminary injunction proceedings against 
plaintiffs. This asymmetrical risk of error clashes with our idea of evenhandedness 
in civil suits, and it is of particular concern when plaintiffs face the possibility of 
irreparable harm. Reallocation of risk of error and increase in risk of error are the 
two most serious problems with applying the FRE to preliminary injunction motions. 
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
At this point I have demonstrated both the shortcomings of several 
justifications for abandoning the FRE and the problems with applying them. So, 
where does that leave us? In this Part, I offer two proposals for how courts—and, 
potentially, rule makers—should use the lessons from this Article. First, I offer a 
proposal that is both more ambitious and more tentative: apply the FRE at 
preliminary injunction proceedings but include an escape hatch for evidence that 
implicates the specific dangers of applying the FRE before the parties have had a 
full opportunity for discovery. But I recognize that is unlikely to happen: courts may 
be uninterested in changing a practice that has not resulted in any outcry from 
parties. In that event, I offer a second, firmer proposal: courts should recognize 
that evidence submitted to show likelihood of success on the merits is  
meta-evidence. They should weigh that evidence by determining how clearly it 
demonstrates that the proponent will be able to produce admissible, credible 
evidence at trial. This would not change what evidence is admissible, but it could 
dramatically change how much probative value judges assign this evidence. 
 
339. See STEIN, supra note 323, at 219. 
340. Id. at 221–22. 
341. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016); Mullins 
v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2010); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d 
Cir. 2004); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Peters, 871 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1989); Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 
805 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1986); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Transcript 
of Court’s Ruling at 34–35, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-00665-F, 2014 WL 7671680  
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2014), ECF No. 179; Rice v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31  
(D. Mass. 2014). 
First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/5/20  9:09 PM 
1384 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1331 
A. Proposal One: Apply the Rules, Add an Exception 
To determine what evidentiary regime best suits the preliminary injunction 
context, I start by reiterating the central goal of preliminary injunctions: to minimize 
“the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty 
decision.”342 Unsurprisingly,343 an evidentiary regime will minimize the probable 
irreparable loss of rights if it facilitates accurate fact finding. First, a judge will tend 
to minimize the “errors” through a more accurate determination of likelihood of 
success on the merits. Second, the judge will be better able to determine the 
irreparable harm to each party—the loss of rights if the court has indeed erred. In 
addition, the evidentiary regime should not reallocate the risk of error between 
parties to too great a degree—it should, as best as possible, put plaintiffs and 
defendants at equal risk of error.344 
So, what rules best facilitate truth seeking? The question has been debated for 
centuries. Jeremy Bentham famously called for a regime of “free proof,” where 
exclusionary rules are largely abolished in the name of truth seeking.345 This idea 
has many fans today—a number of evidence scholars have called for the abolition 
of the rule against hearsay or other exclusionary rules.346 Bentham’s project achieved 
partial success—relevant evidence is presumed admissible, and one of 
Bentham’s major targets was competency rules that excluded witnesses with an 
interest in the case; today nearly all witnesses are deemed competent to testify.347 
But on the whole, Bentham’s view is not encapsulated in the FRE, which are largely 
a list of exclusionary rules. Some of these rules, such as those that protect 
privileges,348 exclude evidence for reasons other than truth seeking.349 But those 
rules are in the minority. In other words, the rule makers—the advisory committee 
 
342. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541. 
343. See D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review 
of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2004) (discussing the “Search for Truth” 
or “Rationalist” model as the dominant account of the purpose of trial). 
344. See STEIN, supra note 323, at 133–40, 219. 
345. See 5 BENTHAM, supra note 236, at 615 (arguing for free proof but also noting that the 
factfinder should be instructed on the untrustworthiness of certain types of evidence); WILLIAM 
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 27–28 (1985); see also Barzun, supra 
note 286, at 1966–67. “Free proof” is not Bentham’s term, but it is now associated with his approach. 
346. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 
B.U. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992) (“The degree of consensus among twentieth century evidence scholars 
concerning the intellectual bankruptcy of hearsay doctrine is nothing short of remarkable.”); Mark 
Spottswood, Signal vs. Noise: Some Comments on Professor Stein’s Theory of Evidential Efficiency, 66  
ALA. L. REV. 471, 471 (2015) (“Evidence is an unusual field of legal study, in part because so many of 
its devotees doubt, from time to time, that it should exist at all.”). 
347. See FED. R. EVID. 402; FED. R. EVID. 601; Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence 
Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 951 (2006); Todd E. Pettys, 
The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 463, 479. 
348. See FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. EVID. 502. 
349. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 5:2. 
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and Congress—made the judgment that exclusionary rules facilitate truth seeking.350 
And the rule makers applied the FRE to bench trials as well as jury trials. 
Without necessarily agreeing with that premise, I take it as an assumption 
inherent in our law of evidence: in the normal trial context, including the  
bench-trial context, the FRE facilitate truth seeking. Any departure from the FRE, 
then, should be justified on the grounds that a new context disrupts the FRE’s 
truth-seeking function, and the departure should do no more than remedy that 
disruption. I have identified this disruption above: in the preliminary injunction 
context, parties are sometimes unable to discover all reliable, relevant evidence 
before the hearing, so excluding evidence inadmissible under the FRE may frustrate 
the truth-seeking process by eliminating the only evidence available to parties with 
meritorious claims. 
But preliminary injunction cases vary dramatically,351 and applying the FRE 
will not always harm accuracy at a preliminary injunction proceeding relative to trial. 
If admissible evidence on point is within the proponent’s possession or easily 
obtainable on short notice, or if the preliminary injunction hearing is held long after 
the motion is filed, the justification for deviating from the FRE no longer applies. 
In many cases, a party may be able to offer evidence that it will be irreparably 
harmed if the court fails to issue an injunction (or does issue an injunction), so 
applying the FRE will not prejudice that party. In addition, Rule 43 explicitly allows 
the motion to be heard partly on affidavits. And as discussed above, much evidence 
submitted on the likelihood-of-success prong will be admissible, because that 
evidence need only point to admissible evidence that the party will produce at trial. 
The harm of applying the FRE arises with regard to only some pieces of evidence in 
some cases. If the rules generally foster accurate fact finding, any deviation from 
those rules should be tailored to only those pieces of evidence where the deviation 
is justified. 
The most straightforward way to target this problem is with an escape  
hatch: an exception to the FRE that allows a court to consider any piece of evidence, 
despite its inadmissibility under the FRE, if it implicates the problems unique to 
offering evidence in the preliminary injunction context. The exception should allow 
only relevant, helpful evidence, of course. And the exception should not allow courts 
to consider evidence that undermines the non-truth-seeking purposes of the FRE, 
such as incentivizing desirable primary conduct. 
With those principles in mind, I propose three criteria for the Preliminary 
Injunction Exception: otherwise inadmissible evidence352 may be considered on a 
preliminary injunction motion if the proponent demonstrates that (1) the time 
 
350. FED. R. EVID. 102 (noting that one purpose of the FRE is “ascertaining the truth”); Seigel, 
supra note 346, at 905 (noting that the standard defense of the rule against hearsay is that “[m]inimizing 
the hearsay risks maximizes the accuracy of the fact-finding process”). 
351. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
352. Evidence that may be considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(c) would 
remain admissible under this rule. 
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constraints of the preliminary injunction make obtaining admissible evidence on the 
same point impracticable; (2) the evidence has sufficient guarantees of 
trustworthiness, considering the time constraints; and (3) admission will not unduly 
prejudice the objecting party. 
Under this exception, a number of Federal Rules of Evidence would still apply. 
The privilege rules would be unaffected by the exception, per Rule 1101(c).353 And 
courts should enforce the categorical exclusions—Rule 408, regulating the 
admissibility of settlement offers, for example—under the directives of FRE 102 
and FRCP 1, which require courts to construe and administer the FRE and FRCP 
“fairly”354 and “to secure the just . . . determination” of the proceeding.355 
Admitting evidence that would disincentivize plea bargaining or disincentivize open 
conversation between attorneys and their clients would thwart important purposes 
of the FRE.356 
Rule 702 and Daubert would still apply, to some degree, under prong two: 
expert testimony that is not the product of reliable principles and methods and 
expert testimony where the principles and methods have been unreliably applied are 
insufficiently trustworthy. However, a court might relax its usual Daubert standards 
for purposes of a preliminary injunction motion. For example, convention holds 
that an effect measured in an experiment is “statistically significant” if the “p-value” 
is less than 0.05.357 In other words, if a researcher wants to investigate whether there 
is a relationship between two variables—say, whether a certain chemical causes fish 
to die—she would gather data, analyze the relationship between the variables in her 
data set, and ask, “If there was no real relationship here—if this chemical did not in 
fact correlate with fish death—would I have less than a 5% chance of observing a 
relationship at least this strong in my data?”358 If the answer is “yes,” she may reject 
the hypothesis that there is no relationship; in other words, she has a significant 
result.359 Null-hypothesis significance testing of this sort has been roundly and 
 
353. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (“The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case  
or proceeding.”). 
354. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
355. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
356. The exception could contain a fourth prong, explicitly allowing the court to consider the 
evidence only if consideration of the evidence will serve, not thwart, the purposes of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and the interests of justice. Rule 807, the residual exception to the hearsay rule, used to 
contain a similar requirement. See FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(4) (amended 2019) (“[A]dmitting [the hearsay 
statement] will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.”). The amendments 
to the Rule eliminated this prong as “superfluous” in light of Rules 102 and 401. See FED. R. EVID. 807 
advisory committee’s note to 2019 amendment. I agree and decline to include an explicit “interests of 
justice” requirement in the proposed Rule. 
357. See Saul McLeod, What a P-Value Tells You About Statistical Significance, SIMPLY 
PSYCHOL. (May 20, 2019), https://www.simplypsychology.org/p-value.html [https://perma.cc/
2DUR-22YG]. 
358. See Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (p < .05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997,  
997–98 (1994). 
359. “The overwhelming majority of courts have accepted as dogma a rule that any P-value 
greater than either .05 or less than two standard deviations is not sufficient to disprove a null hypothesis 
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persuasively criticized for decades.360 Nevertheless, the method and convention 
persist. Even if a court would otherwise require evidence to meet this p < 0.05 
threshold, as courts occasionally do,361 the court may soften this requirement at the 
preliminary injunction hearing. If a party’s expert has not had time to collect enough 
data to yield a significant result, the court, considering the facts in front of it, may 
decide that p < 0.10 is sufficient for the purposes of the preliminary injunction 
stage. But the judge would still need to analyze reliability under the Daubert standard 
to see how reliable she believed it to be. 
Other rules, including the rule against hearsay and the “best evidence” rule, 
which requires a party to produce an original document, recording, or photograph 
to prove its contents,362 are more likely to bend. Parties may not always be able to 
track down the original evidentiary source before a preliminary injunction hearing; 
hearsay and summaries of document content may, depending on the circumstances, 
be sufficiently reliable; and in certain cases, consideration of this evidence will not 
prejudice the other party. 
A new exception to the FRE may sound like a cop-out: too easy to conjure up 
and too difficult to apply. But in this case, the exception has several advantages and 
few disadvantages. As for advantages, it maintains many of the benefits of applying 
rules, generally.363 If a party objected to the evidence, the court would first consider 
whether it is admissible under the FRE—forcing it to articulate and appreciate a 
theory of relevance. The court would then need to consider whether the evidence 
is trustworthy and unduly prejudicial, forcing it to consider any dangers inherent in 
the evidence. Further, while admissibility will not be as predictable as it would be 
without the exception, it is far more predictable than without any rules. Parties will 
know that as a general matter, they will have to submit admissible evidence, and 
they will know what they have to show if they can obtain only inadmissible evidence 
 
of random chance.” Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting 
Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 821 (2010) (criticizing courts’ 
reliance on p-values). 
360. See Daniel J. Benjamin et al., Redefine Statistical Significance, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 6 
(2018); Cohen, supra note 358, at 997–98; William W. Rozeboom, The Fallacy of the Null-Hypothesis 
Significance Test, 57 PSYCHOL. BULL. 416 (1960); Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Legal 
Sufficiency of Statistical Evidence (George Mason Legal Studies Research, Paper No. LS 18-29, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238793 [https://perma.cc/X6EX-F2BJ ] (concluding that evidence 
should be legally sufficient when p < 0.5, not 0.05); Dan Kahan, The Earth Is (Still) Round, Even at P 
< 0.005, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT: BLOG (Aug. 23, 2017, 7:40 AM), http://
www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2017/8/23/the-earth-is-still-round-even-at-p-0005.html [https://
perma.cc/Z4ST-2VUV]. 
361. See DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW 
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 12.8.4 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that in 
some contexts, “courts have treated statistical significance as an important consideration affecting the 
admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert”); see also Bruce R. Parker, Effective Strategies for Closing 
the Door on Junk Science Experts, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 338, 347 (1998) (advising attorneys to “educate” 
the court about the p < 0.05 standard at Daubert hearings). 
362. See FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
363. See supra Section III.A. 
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in time for the hearing. Further, it discourages parties from purposefully introducing 
more favorable, inadmissible evidence, as they know they will have to justify  
its consideration.364 
While three prongs may sound time consuming, two of them pose questions 
familiar to a judge: How trustworthy is the evidence?365 Will it unduly prejudice the 
other party?366 Those questions are often decided fairly quickly. As for the first 
prong, the proponent or their attorney could testify to any efforts made to secure 
admissible evidence and why those efforts failed, or they could testify to what 
difficult or time-consuming tasks would be necessary to obtain admissible evidence. 
And the court could limit this presentation, so significant hearing time would not 
be spent arguing about admissibility. 
The exception may seem unnecessary, as the FRE already contain a residual 
exception to the rule against hearsay, Rule 807. And a broad reading of that Rule 
could allow much of the evidence allowed by the Preliminary Injunction Exception. 
In particular, Rule 807 states that the hearsay must be “more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain 
through reasonable efforts.”367 The phrase “reasonable efforts” could be read in 
context to mean “reasonable efforts under the time constraints attendant to a 
preliminary injunction motion.” And while the old version of Rule 807 required the 
hearsay statement to have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness,”368 meaning the hearsay must be as trustworthy as hearsay 
permitted by the enumerated exceptions,369 the newly-amended Rule 807 requires 
only “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness,”370 similar to the proposed 
exception. The proposed exception, then, does not deviate much from existing law. 
However, the Preliminary Injunction Exception would clarify that time constraints, 
specifically, justify admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence, and it would address 
admissibility despite exclusionary rules other than the rule against hearsay. It is not 
simply redundant with Rule 807. 
There are two ways the FRE and this exception could be implemented. First, 
the exception could be implemented by an amendment to either the FRCP or the 
FRE. The two most logical locations for the rule are as an addition to the 
Preliminary Injunctions Rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, or as an 
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(b), setting out the applicability of the 
FRE. In either location, the rule would prescribe that the FRE apply to preliminary 
 
364. See Nance, supra note 301. 
365. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1); FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B); FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(3). 
366. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1). These 
rules are not specifically evidentiary, but they require the court to evaluate the prejudice of a change in 
litigation circumstances. 
367. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2). 
368. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1) (amended Dec. 1, 2019). 
369. See 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 8:141. 
370. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1). 
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injunction motions, with an exception. Although, as I have argued, the FRE should, 
by its own terms, apply to preliminary injunction hearings, courts would not be so 
quick to ignore a rule that explicitly makes the FRE applicable. 
Second, courts could simply begin announcing that they will apply the FRE at 
the preliminary injunction stage unless the evidence meets the criteria in the 
exception. In circuits where the court of appeals has explicitly said they do not apply, 
that court can reverse course. In circuits that have not discussed the issue, district 
courts can just begin to apply the FRE; ideally, they would include this policy in the 
local rules or post it in their chambers rules to put the parties on notice. Although 
the exception would contravene the text of the Federal Rules—which apply the 
FRE in full—as courts have not previously been applying the FRE, it is unlikely that 
they would feel they were exceeding their authority by beginning to apply the rules 
with one exception. 
Either way, applying the FRE plus an escape hatch at the preliminary 
injunction phase would give us the best of both worlds: the predictability and 
reason-giving forced by rules and the flexibility necessary to facilitate truth seeking. 
I said this proposal was both ambitious and tentative. The ambition is  
clear: what I suggest goes against what every court has prescribed. The tentativeness 
is related. Although there are a number of deficiencies with the current haphazard 
system, there has been no great outcry from litigants or judges. Although I have not 
found any relevant empirical work, it may be that the existing system works 
reasonably well. In fact, many scholars would argue that this discretionary regime is 
far preferable to the rules-bound regime we have in bench trials.371 A judge who 
receives all available evidence and chooses whether to consider it and how heavily 
to weigh it may be in a better position to determine truth than a judge who considers 
only information admissible under the FRE. In that case, the better remedy would 
not be to level up but rather to level down: Stop applying the FRE to bench trials. 
Or any trials. Let Bentham’s free proof reign supreme. I don’t argue against that 
point because I think it’s wrong—it may well be right. But I take it as a given that 
we are not about to eliminate the FRE, because we think that, on the whole, they 
are helpful. It is only because I accept that premise that I recommend expanding 
the FRE’s purview instead of contracting it. 
B. Proposal Two: Weigh Meta-Evidence Appropriately 
But perhaps that ship has also sailed. Perhaps everyone is sufficiently happy 
with the status quo, and courts will continue to accept whatever evidence they deem 
sufficiently reliable and give it whatever weight they deem appropriate. In that case, 
 
371. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50  
A.B.A. J. 723 (1964); Peter L. Murray & John C. Sheldon, Should the Rules of Evidence Be Modified for 
Civil Non-Jury Trials?, 17 ME. B.J. 30 (2002); Schauer, supra note 316, at 166 n.4 (citing James  
H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules 
of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937 (1962)); John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of 
Evidentiary Admissibility in Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227, 231 (2003). 
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I have a second proposal—and this one I offer without hesitation: understand that 
evidence of likelihood of success on the merits is meta-evidence and weigh  
it accordingly. 
Whether or not the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing 
is admissible, in order for a party to succeed at trial, that party will have to offer 
admissible evidence. Therefore, in order to demonstrate likelihood of success on 
the merits, the party has to present evidence to the court tending to prove that it 
will be able to offer admissible evidence at trial.372 Evidence introduced to prove 
likelihood of success on the merits is probative only to the extent that it tends to 
prove the proponent will offer admissible evidence when it counts. 
If the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing is itself 
admissible, this evidence is likely dispositive of what will be presented at trial. Unless 
there is some reason to believe the same evidence will not be available at trial, the 
court can simply look at how far the evidence goes toward proving the proponent’s 
case on the merits. 
If, on the other hand, the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction 
hearing would not be admissible at trial, the court must determine, from that 
evidence, how likely it is that the proponent will be able to present admissible 
evidence at trial. The court’s task is not to determine how well the inadmissible 
evidence proves the merits. It is only to determine likelihood of success. For example, 
take a copyright case, where the plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied the 
plaintiff’s original work.373 The plaintiff testifies at the preliminary injunction 
hearing: “The defendant and I spoke before the hearing and tried to resolve the 
case. During that conversation, he admitted to me that he copied my work.” A 
reasonable factfinder might find this to be strong evidence of copying. However, 
this is not very probative of whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed at trial: the 
defendant’s statement made during settlement negotiations would be inadmissible 
at trial to prove the validity of the claim under FRE 408(a)(2),374 and a judge might 
be skeptical that the defendant would repeat the statement on the witness stand. 
This evidence, then, while strong evidence of the merits, is fairly weak evidence of 
likelihood of success on the merits.375 The court should weigh it accordingly. 
To be clear, courts should weigh meta-evidence this way whether or not they are 
applying the FRE at the preliminary injunction hearing. But there is one difference 
 
372. Cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 555 (“Although the court cannot know at the preliminary 
hearing what evidence the parties will present at trial, it can estimate the probability of different findings 
of fact by using affidavits, representations of counsel, inferences from the failure to produce accessible 
evidence, and the judge’s own notions about the plausibility of the parties’ contentions.”). 
373. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
374. Most courts would probably exclude this statement from the preliminary injunction 
hearing. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. But a court that did not follow the FRE at all 
would permit it. 
375. The evidence is helpful meta-evidence to the extent it suggests the defendant would testify 
to copying at trial, or it suggests the defendant has admitted the copying to others, and those witnesses 
could testify. 
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between a court weighing meta-evidence under the FRE and one weighing  
meta-evidence without those limitations. If a court has abandoned the FRE, it may 
make inferences prohibited by those rules in determining likelihood of success. In 
the hypothetical copyright case above, a court applying the FRE could not infer from 
the plaintiff’s testimony that the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work. The judge 
may not consider statements made during settlement negotiations as evidence 
proving the validity of the claim. However, if a court is not applying the FRE, it may 
infer that the defendant actually made this statement during settlement negotiations 
and, therefore, that he actually copied the plaintiff’s work. That inference may be 
helpful to the judge, because the judge may run through the following chain  
of reasoning: 
This testimony suggests the defendant said he copied the plaintiff’s work; 
that, in turn, suggests he did, in fact, copy the plaintiff’s work; and that, in 
turn, suggests that even if this evidence is inadmissible, there is likely to be 
other evidence of copying introduced at trial. If he in fact copied, the 
plaintiff is likely to find evidence of copying. 
Through this reasoning, the plaintiff’s testimony is probative of likelihood of 
success. It is not nearly as probative as it would be if it pointed directly to admissible 
evidence. But it is not irrelevant. 
There is a potential injustice lurking here: If the point of a preliminary 
injunction is to prevent irreparable harm, why are we not concerned with the merits 
themselves? Why are we concerned only with likelihood of success later on? Is it not 
more just for a plaintiff to get the preliminary injunction he needs and (in a sense) 
deserves, even if he will eventually lose at trial? First, independent of whether it is a 
good standard or a bad standard, “likelihood of success on the merits” is the 
standard we have.376 The Supreme Court has directed that “likely to succeed” is one 
of the four preliminary injunction factors, so this is the inquiry courts must 
undertake. Evidence that does not tend to show whether the plaintiff can succeed 
at trial is irrelevant to the inquiry. 
Second, the standard is sensible given the purpose of a preliminary injunction. 
As Leubsdorf discusses, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to minimize the 
loss of “rights” caused by “errors” that stem from the short timeline.377 A 
preliminary injunction decision is “erroneous” only “in the sense that it may be 
different from the decision that ultimately will be reached.”378 In other words, the 
parties’ “rights” are “legal rights”379 determined by the trial on the merits. If the 
preliminary injunction decision deviates from the decision on the merits, one party 
has suffered a loss of “rights,” due to the preliminary injunction decision. If a court 
 
376. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a 
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits . . . .”). 
377. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541. 
378. Id. 
379. See id. (“Not even all irreparable harm, but only irreparable harm to legal rights,  
should count.”). 
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were to make its preliminary injunction decision not based on likelihood of success 
at trial, that court would fail to minimize the probable loss of rights. 
A further difficulty arises when evidence relates to both likelihood of success 
on the merits and irreparable harm. Some causes of action that might form the basis 
of a preliminary injunction motion, such as defamation or false advertising, have 
“harm” as an element of the claim itself.380 To show likelihood of success on the 
merits, then, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it will be able to show harm at trial. 
That inquiry, however, is distinct from the showing of irreparable harm at the 
preliminary injunction phase: at the first stage, the plaintiff must show that absent 
a preliminary injunction, it will suffer harm that cannot be remedied at trial.381 But 
the two inquiries will likely overlap.382 The plaintiff may present evidence that the 
defendant’s actions are likely to cause harm, and this evidence can relate to both the 
irreparable-harm prong and the likelihood-of-success prong. But the court should 
approach the evidence differently, depending on which prong it is analyzing. For 
the irreparable-harm inquiry, the evidence is probative to the extent it tends to show 
likelihood of harm; for the likelihood-of-success inquiry, the evidence is probative 
to the extent it tends to show that the plaintiff will be able to present evidence of 
harm at trial. Therefore, if a court does not follow the FRE at the preliminary 
injunction hearing, the plaintiff may present inadmissible evidence of irreparable 
harm. That evidence could—in theory—be very probative on the irreparable-harm 
prong and far less probative on the likelihood-of-success prong, if it does not 
suggest admissible evidence to come. The court should consider the probative value 
of the evidence on each inquiry separately. 
We can now return to the Giuliani statement. The district court appeared to 
take this statement as direct evidence of President Trump’s animus against 
Muslims.383 But the statement—that President Trump told him to create a legal 
version of the Muslim ban—is probative only on the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits 
inquiry, and it is probative only to the extent that it points to admissible evidence. 
 
 380.  See Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that a statement is 
defamatory under Pennsylvania law only if it tends to harm another’s reputation); Clark v. Time Inc., 
242 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1215 (D. Kan. 2017) (noting that a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim under 
Kansas law must establish “injury to plaintiff’s reputation”); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, 
Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008) (listing injury or likelihood of injury as one element of a false 
advertising claim a plaintiff must show to establish likelihood of success on the merits). Courts 
frequently say injunctions are typically inappropriate in defamation cases. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1987). These cases often focus on prior restraints; 
injunctions requiring a party to take down specific material may be less troubling.  
381. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541. 
 382. Cf. Vonderheide v. Harrisburg Area Cmty. Coll., No. 19-3096, 2019 WL 5423089, at *6, 
*10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019) (addressing harm to reputation in both likelihood of success analysis and 
irreparable harm analysis); Muhaisen v. Does 1 Through 100, No. 17-cv-01575-PAB-KLM, 2017 WL 
6945043, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 2017) (considering harm to reputation and business when analyzing 
both likelihood of success and irreparable harm); Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Cavatorta N. Am., Inc., 146 
F. Supp. 3d 356, 363 (D. Mass. 2015) (referring to danger of damage to reputation in both likelihood 
of success analysis and irreparable harm analysis noting they “dovetail[]”). 
383. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558 (D. Md. 2017). 
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Even under the FRE, the evidence is admissible on this point as non-hearsay, but 
only because the court should not use it as evidence of animus. Rather, it is evidence 
that this potential witness could testify at trial about the origins of the ban, and that 
this evidence would tend to support the plaintiffs’ claim. If the FRE don’t apply, 
the interview might tend to prove animus, but that is helpful only to the extent that 
it suggests additional admissible evidence of animus might emerge before trial. 
Either way, the evidence is admissible, but it is less probative than some courts  
have suggested. 
CONCLUSION 
Classically, the FRE operate to keep prejudicial or unreliable evidence from a 
jury, so the jury can render an accurate final verdict at a trial that takes place after 
months or years of discovery. The preliminary injunction hearing is a different sort 
of proceeding: it takes place before a judge, often after little time to discover 
evidence, and it does not involve a final decision on the merits. Courts have thrown 
off the yoke of the FRE under these circumstances. Yet the reasons for deviating 
from the usual practice are surprisingly thin: the FRE apply to bench trials as well 
as jury trials; they are highly consequential, even if they do not involve a final 
decision on the merits; and one of the major inquiries at this stage—likelihood of 
success on the merits—allows courts to consider evidence that would not be 
admissible on the merits. A narrow, discretionary exception can retain the benefits 
of the rules while accounting for the situations where the haste of a preliminary 
injunction motion calls for flexibility. 
But even if the old system remains in place, and courts continue to disregard 
the rules, the FRE cast a shadow over the preliminary injunction motion: The court 
must determine likelihood of success on the merits, and parties will succeed at trial 
only if they are able to present admissible evidence. The FRE, then, still have a 
function in determining the evidentiary weight of meta-evidence. Even at a 
preliminary injunction hearing, the Federal Rules of Evidence are inescapable. 
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